[NEWS] Seti@home information leakage and remote compromise

From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 04/09/03

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    From: support@securiteam.com
    To: list@securiteam.com
    Date: 9 Apr 2003 22:51:31 +0200
    
    

    The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
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      Seti@home information leakage and remote compromise
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

     <http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/> SETI@home is a scientific experiment
    that uses Internet-connected computers in the Search for Extraterrestrial
    Intelligence (SETI). You can participate by running a free program that
    downloads and analyzes radio telescope data.
    The SETI@home program is a special kind of screensaver. Like other
    screensavers it starts up when you leave your computer unattended, and it
    shuts down as soon as you return to work. What it does in the interim is
    unique.
    There are currently over four million registered users of seti@home. Over
    half a million of these users are "active"; they have returned at least
    one result within the last four weeks.

    Security vulnerabilities in the Seti@home application leak potentially
    sensitive information and also enable remote root compromise of the
    machines running seti@home.

    DETAILS

    Vulnerable versions:
    All versions under 3.08

    The seti@home clients use the HTTP protocol to download new work units,
    user information and to register new users. The implementation leaves two
    security vulnerabilities:

    1) All information is sent in plaintext across the network. This
    information includes the processor type and the operating system of the
    machine seti@home is running on.

    Sniffing the information exposed by the seti@home client is trivial and
    very useful to a malicious person planning an attack on a network. A
    passive scan of machines on a network can be made using any packet sniffer
    to grab the information from the network.

    2) There is a buffer overflow in the server responds handler. Sending an
    overly large string followed by a newline ('\n') character to the client
    will trigger this overflow. This has been tested with various versions of
    the client. All versions are presumed to have this flaw in some form.

    All tested clients have similar buffer overflows, which allowed setting
    eip to an arbitrary value which can lead to remote code execution. An
    attacker would have to reroute the connection the client tries to make to
    the seti@home webserver to a machine he or she controls. This can be done
    using various widely available spoofing tools. Seti@home also has the
    ability to use a HTTP-proxy, and an attacker could also use the machine
    the PROXY runs on as a base for this attack. Routers can also be used as a
    base for this attack.

    3) A similar buffer overflow seems to affect the main seti@home server at
    shserver2.ssl.berkeley.edu. It closes the connection after receiving a too
    large string of bytes followed by a '\n'.

    Exploitation of the bug in the server has not been tested. It should be
    note that a successful exploitation of the bug in the server would offer a
    platform from which all seti@home clients can be exploited.

    Vendor status:
    Vendor notified.
    Several patches were released.

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    Information provided by: Berend-Jan Wever
    <mailto:SkyLined@edup.tudelft.nl> SkyLined@edup.tudelft.nl.

    ========================================

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