[NT] Multiple Issues in Nettelephone Dialer
From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 01/08/03
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: 8 Jan 2003 11:22:07 +0200
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Multiple Issues in Nettelephone Dialer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
<http://www.Nettelephone.com> Nettelephone is a PC to Phone service
provider. The program suffers from a few security problems/design errors
which should be resolved to make the service more secure.
DETAILS
1. Weak Encryption for Account Information:
The dialer (Executable tested- Netfone.exe Version 3.5.6) stores the
account number and PIN, besides other account info, in the registry under
the key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MediaRing.com\SDK\NetTelephone\settings
and the values are "account" (a string value of length 12) and "pin" (a
string value of length 6). The account number is stored in plaintext
whereas the PIN is stored in encrypted form. However the encryption is
very weak and can be easily broken.
The encryption used is a replacement cipher with decimal place based
standard cipher codes used for each valid digit ranging from 0-9.
Enumerating all the standard cipher codes enables a malicious attacker to
steal a valid user's account information and use it to abuse the account.
Demonstration:
The table below gives the cipher codes used:
|- - -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -6-
|
|
(0) 75 76 79 7E 65 6E
|
|
(1) 74 77 78 7F 64 6F
|
|
(2) 77 74 7B 7C 67 6C
|
|
(3) 76 75 7A 7D 66 6D
|
|
(4) 71 72 7D 7A 61 6A
|
|
(5) 70 73 7C 7B 60 6B
|
|
(6) 73 70 7F 78 63 68
|
|
(7) 72 71 7E 79 62 69
|
|
(8) 7D 7E 71 76 6D 66
|
|
(9) 7C 7F 70 77 6C 67
The columns indicate the decimal places and the rows indicate the digits.
Suppose, if the encrypted value in the registry "pin" key is
"70727A7C656B", we first separate the characters in six groups of two.
Thus, we get "70" "72" "7A" "7C" "65" "6B". Now, referring the table gives
us the original unencrypted value of the PIN. For instance, the number in
the first place is "70". To find its original value, we look for the
number "70" in the first column. We see that it is in the fifth column.
Therefore, the decrypted number in the first place is "5". Continuing
this, we get the decrypted PIN as "543205".
Solution:
Obfuscating the PIN, like it is being done here, is probably the only
practical solution for small software like this one but steps should be
taken to make it harder to crack. An obfuscation algorithm which gets
cracked in 5-10 minutes is just not enough.
2. Demo Call Duration:
The dialer (Executable tested - Netelph.exe Version 3.2.5) offers demo
calls to three 1-800 numbers. The duration for these calls is 45 seconds
and is disconnected automatically after this time is up. The demo call
settings are stored in the registry key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MediaRing.com\SDK\NetTelephone\One\democall.
The duration of the demo call is decided by the DWORD value "demoduration"
that is stored under the above key.
It is possible to extend the duration of this call by increasing this
value arbitrarily. The demo calls are mostly disconnected while the user
is still in the voice menu stage and before anyone answers the call. When
the duration of the demo is increased, the stage where somebody picks up
the phone on the other end is reached and this may potentially cause an
annoyance.
Although it is not a security issue per se, rather a design error which
can cause potential annoyance to the call center personnel but, obviously,
this behavior of the dialer is not intended.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:sgmasood@yahoo.com> S G
Masood.
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