[UNIX] zkfingerd Format String Vulnerability
From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 12/25/02
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: 25 Dec 2002 11:23:54 +0200
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
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zkfingerd Format String Vulnerability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
<http://sourceforge.net/projects/zkfingerd> zkfingerd is an open-source
replacement for standard finger daemons running on Linux systems.
zkfingerd suffers from several format string vulnerabilities that, when
exploited, can allow the remote execution of arbitrary code.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
* zkfingerd version 0.9.1 and earlier
The first format string vulnerability can be found in the putlog()
function of log.c. An unsafe call is made to the syslog() function.
.
syslog(LOG_INFO, c);
.
To make this safe a format string should be specified:
.
syslog(LOG_INFO,"%s", c);
.
By fingering a "user" and designing a special format string as the user,
it is possible to overwrite arbitray locations in memory with values
supplied by an attacker using the %n specifier. This can lead to arbitrary
code execution.
Further format string vulnerabilities, that all have the same root cause,
are due to the say() function:
void
say(char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
vprintf(fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
printf("\r\n");
fflush(stdout);
return;
}
If, when say() is called, the first argument is not a format string but
input a remote user can control then the vulnerability will manifest
itself. One such place is in the file_list() function:
if(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
{
char *y, *z;
files++;
z = xmalloc(strlen(de->d_name) + 2);
strcpy(z, de->d_name);
strcat(z, "/");
x = xmalloc(32 + strlen(de->d_name));
y = my_ctime(st.st_mtime);
sprintf(x, "\t%-12s\t%s\t-- DIR --", z, y);
say(x);
xfree(x);
xfree(y);
xfree(z);
continue;
}
In this case if the name of a directory contains an attacker supplied
format string then it can overwrite arbitrary locations in memory with
attacker supplied values.
Fix Information:
NGSSoftware alerted the author of zkfingerd with these problems on the
27th of November, 2002. The author responded quickly and made the relevant
security fixes. Patched source code can be download from CVS @
Sourceforge.
<http://cvs.sourceforge.net/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/zkfingerd/zkfingerd/src/>
http://cvs.sourceforge.net/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/zkfingerd/zkfingerd/src/
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The original advisory can be downloaded from:
<http://www.nextgenss.com/advisories/zkfingerd.txt>
http://www.nextgenss.com/advisories/zkfingerd.txt.
The information has been provided by <mailto:nisr@nextgenss.com>
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research.
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