[NT] Password Disclosure in Cryptainer

From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 12/20/02

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To: list@securiteam.com
Date: 20 Dec 2002 01:28:23 +0200

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      Password Disclosure in Cryptainer
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

    Cryptainer PE's ease of use together with its powerful 448 bit strong
    encryption provides file security without changing the way you work. It
    creates a 100MB encrypted drive that can be loaded and unloaded as
    required. It combines ease of use and simple drag-and-drop operations with
    powerful 448 bit strong encryption ensuring total security with phenomenal
    ease of use and maximum convenience. Both products use the Blowfish
    algorithm.

    A vulnerability in the product allows a user with access to the local
    machine to recover the password protected by the product, by examining the
    memory content of the product (by causing it or the operating system to
    dump its memory's content).

    DETAILS

    Vulnerable systems:
     * Cryptainer PE
     * Cryptainer 2.0

    Both the versions of Cryptainer store the password in clear text in the
    memory of the process without encrypting it or nullifying it. This
    password is clearly visible as long as the following two conditions are
    satisfied:
    1. The user has entered the password at least once
    2. Cryptainer is loaded

    The encrypted volume may or may not be loaded. Since this product comes
    with an option to minimize to the System Tray, it is quite likely that the
    user would keep Cryptainer running without loading the encrypted volume
    containing the encrypted files. In such a case, a user might assume that
    since the encrypted volume is not loaded, his files are safe. But an
    intruder who is able to dump the memory of the running process can ferret
    out the password with relative ease. Besides the password, the physical
    path of the volume is also clearly visible. Also Cryptainer does not
    provide a limit to the number of wrong password attempts. So an intruder
    must collect the memory dump, and copy the physical location of the
    logical volume (which is actually one big file) onto his machine, and then
    run Cryptainer and check all the strings in the memory dump for the
    correct password.

    References:
    A similar vulnerability was found in Password Safe written by crypto-guru
    Bruce Schneier. This was acknowledged by him and addressed by the
    developer of the open source version of this product. Bruce Schneier's
    response is here: <http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0111.html#6>
    http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0111.html#6

    Vendor Response:
    The vendor response is somehow not so clear. We have corresponded with
    them repeatedly since November 23rd. The essence that we have been able to
    make out is that they will probably look into it in their next release
    sometime in the first quarter of 2003. Their contention is also that with
    the kind of physical access required for this to work, the intruder might
    as well install a keylogger.

    Workaround:
    Do not keep Cryptainer minimized in the System Tray even if you have
    unloaded the encrypted volume. Exit the software as soon as you have
    finished encrypting/decrypting the files, by clicking on the Shutdown and
    Exit button.

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The information has been provided by <mailto:cto@nii.co.in> K. K.
    Mookhey.

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