[UNIX] Fetchmail Remote Vulnerability (Localhost @)
From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 12/15/02
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: 15 Dec 2002 23:32:36 +0200
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
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Fetchmail Remote Vulnerability (Localhost @)
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SUMMARY
In the light of recent discoveries e-Matters reaudited Fetchmail and found
another buffer overflow within the default configuration. This heap
overflow can be used by remote attackers to crash it or to execute
arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running fetchmail.
Depending on the configuration this allows a remote root compromise.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
* Fetchmail version 6.1.3 and prior
When Fetchmail retrieves a mail it performs the so called reply-hack. This
basically means that all headers that contain addresses are searched for
local addresses (without @domain part). When such an address is found,
Fetchmail appends a @ and the hostname of the mail server to it. To avoid
unnecessary reallocating of the output buffer during this process
Fetchmail counts the number of addresses within the headerline first. Then
it reserves enough space for the case that all addresses are locals.
Unfortunately this calculation is wrong because it counts:
A) To many addresses and
B) Only takes the hostname in count and not the extra @ which is also
appended.
This means at the moment where you have enough (due to a) local addresses
within the headerline every additional address will overflow the buffer by
one byte. This results in an arbitrary size heap overflow, which was
proved to be exploitable on our Linux boxes. Due to the fact that this
heap overflow occurs in malloc()ed areas we believe that BSD systems can
only be crashed with this bug.
Finally it is important to mention that an attacker does not need to spoof
dns records, or control the mail server to exploit this bug. It is usually
enough to send a mail to the victim that contains specially crafted header
lines.
Vendor Response:
08. December 2002 A patch that fixes this vulnerability was mailed to the
vendor.
13. December 2002 Vendor released Fetchmail v6.2.0 which fixes this
vulnerability.
Recommendation:
If you are running Fetchmail we suggest to upgrade to a new or patched
version as soon as possible.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The original advisory can be downloaded by going to:
<http://security.e-matters.de/advisories/052002.html>
http://security.e-matters.de/advisories/052002.html
The information has been provided by <mailto:s.esser@e-matters.de> Stefan
Esser of e-Matters.
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