[UNIX] Local Netfilter / IPTables IP Queue PID Wrap Flaw
From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 12/08/02
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: 8 Dec 2002 23:23:33 +0200
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Local Netfilter / IPTables IP Queue PID Wrap Flaw
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
A security vulnerability in Netfilter/IPTables will allow under certain
circumstances, an unprivileged local user to be able to read a limited
amount of arbitrary IPv4 or IPv6 traffic.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
Linux 2.4 kernels up to and including 2.4.19, and Linux 2.5 kernels up to
and including 2.5.31, where Netfilter / IPTables is enabled, and where
either of the experimental IP queuing modules (ip_queue, ip6_queue) are in
use.
Immune systems:
* Linux kernels version 2.4.20 (stable) and up
* Linux kernels version 2.5.32 (development) and up
Under Linux 2.4 and 2.5, an experimental IP packet queuing feature is
available as part of Netfilter / IPTables. This consists of kernel modules
and a userspace library which allow userspace mediation and modification
of IPv4 and IPv6 packets.
A userspace mediation process must normally be privileged (requiring
NET_ADMIN capability) to process packets from the kernel. To commence
mediating packets, a userspace process typically sends a Netlink message
to the associated kernel module, specifying queuing parameters. The kernel
module captures the UNIX process ID (PID) of the process to ensure
reliable queuing and delivery of packets.
If the privileged mediation process exits, an unprivileged process
re-using the same PID may be able to receive a limited amount of network
traffic.
This would only occur if no network traffic was queued between the exit of
the privileged process and the establishment of the unprivileged process,
as the kernel module will reset the queuing session upon transmission
error to userspace.
The kernel module will only transmit a limited number of packets to the
userspace process without acknowledgment. As all transmissions from
userspace to the kernel module require NET_ADMIN capability, the
unprivileged process will not be able to acknowledge packets. Thus, the
maximum number of packets that the unprivileged process can read is
limited to the queue length (default 1024 packets). The unprivileged
process can also only read packets which have been selected for queuing
via IPTables by a privileged process.
This flaw is theorized to be difficult and somewhat invasive to exploit,
probably requiring a combined use of DoS attacks. It was discovered by the
author of the code, and no exploits are known to exist.
Fixing the flaw involved implementing a reliable mechanism for detecting
when the Netlink control socket of a privileged mediation process is
closed, and resetting the kernel queuing session state upon such events.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:jmorris@intercode.com.au>
James Morris.
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