[NEWS] Default SNMP Community in Surecom Broadband Router
From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 11/18/02
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: 18 Nov 2002 10:36:01 +0200
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
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Default SNMP Community in Surecom Broadband Router
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SUMMARY
The default router Surecom Broadband installation enables SNMP (Simple
Network Management Protocol) server with default community names for read
and read/write access. This would allow a remote attacker to completely
compromise the remote router.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
* Surecom Broadband Router EP-4501
Both the community name public (Which allows read access to the mentioned
device, providing enumeration and gathering of sensitive network
information) and the community name secret (Which allows read/write access
to device, thus allowing restart and change of the network settings of the
broadband router) are present in the default installation of the router.
The SNMP server is enabled by default from the LAN and WAN interfaces.
Impact:
This vulnerability allows LAN and internet malicious attackers to retrieve
and change network settings of the router.
Possible Solutions:
Disable default SNMP implementation, or change default community names.
Vendor response:
According to the Arhont Ltd. policy, all of the found vulnerabilities and
security issues will be reported to the manufacturer 7 days before
releasing them to the public domains.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:andrei@arhont.com> Andrei
Mikhailovsky.
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