[NEWS] Multiple Security Vulnerabilities in Sharp Zaurus
From: support@securiteam.comDate: 07/11/02
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2002 12:16:06 +0200 (CEST)
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Multiple Security Vulnerabilities in Sharp Zaurus
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
The <http://developer.sharpsec.com/> Sharp Zaurus SL-5000D and SL-5500
have multiple security vulnerabilities in design and implementation that
affect system security.
The first vulnerability gives a remote attacker full control of the Zaurus
filesystem, including the ability to overwrite files and/or programs with
Trojans.
The second vulnerability affects the Zaurus passcode function, which locks
the Zaurus so that no data can be input via the keypad and touch screen.
DETAILS
Vulnerability 1: Remote filesystem access
The Sharp(R) Zaurus(tm) SL-5000D and SL-5500 handhelds use FTP for
performing sync operations with a PC. The FTP daemon on both Zaurus models
is built into QPE, the default windowing system for the units, on port
4242. The daemon binds to all network interfaces on the Zaurus, including
any wireless network or PPP interfaces.
This FTP service gives any remote user access to the Zaurus filesystem as
root, via any network interface. Setting the root password on the Zaurus
has no effect, as the FTP daemon does not actually authenticate the user.
By default, the Zaurus has no root password.
Vulnerability 2: Passcode
The Zaurus stores the screen-locking passcode in the file
/home/root/Settings/Security.conf. The passcode program uses the same salt
value every time the passcode is set: A0. Knowing this, a cracker can
generate a passcode table approximately 4G in size, which can be used to
look up the passcode given the file Security.conf.
Fixes:
Vulnerability 1: Remote filesystem access
Zaurus users who use Ethernet or PPP to attach to a network should either
discontinue use of QPE or place themselves behind a firewall until a patch
for QPE is released.
Vulnerability 2: Passcode
This issue is larger than it sounds. Changing the passcode utility so that
it does a crypt() call on plaintext passcode, using a new salt value each
time, is difficult because the Zaurus generates very little random number
data.
Only interrupts from the keyboard and front buttons call
add_interrupt_randomness() in the kernel. Screen taps do not, nor do
CompactFlash events. Many users will only input via the screen, using
handwriting recognition or the built-in software keyboard. Changing the
interrupt handler for the screen to call add_interrupt_randomness() should
add sufficient entropy to the random number pool to generate a
sufficiently random salt on the fly.
Vendor status:
Sharp Support has been notified of both issues and responded 7 June 2002
with, "We have passed this information on to the engineers who have been
working on that issue."
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:chapin@ecs.syr.edu> Dr.
Steve Chapin, <mailto:dfc@anize.org> Douglas F. Calvert,
<mailto:dwalter@syr.edu> David Walter, <mailto:krwightm@syralumni.org> K.
Reid Wightman, <mailto:nsivakum@syr.edu> Niranjan Sivakumar.
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