[UNIX] Bypassing Libsafe Format String Protection
From: support@securiteam.comDate: 03/23/02
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2002 18:53:30 +0100 (CET)
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Bypassing Libsafe Format String Protection
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
<http://www.research.avayalabs.com/project/libsafe/> Libsafe provides
ineffective protection against format string exploit attacks that may be
trivially bypassed.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
Libsafe version up to 2.0-11
Immune systems:
Libsafe version 2.0-12 and above
The Libsafe library protects a process against the exploitation of buffer
overflow vulnerabilities in process stacks. Libsafe works with any
existing pre-compiled executable and can be used transparently, even on a
system-wide basis. The method intercepts all calls to library functions
that are known to be vulnerable. A substitute version of the corresponding
function implements the original functionality, but in a manner that
ensures that any buffer overflows are contained within the current stack
frame. Libsafe has been shown to detect several known attacks and can
potentially prevent yet unknown attacks.
Details:
1. Libsafe protection against format string exploits may be easily
bypassed using flag characters that are implemented in glibc but are not
implemented in Libsafe.
These flags defined in SUSv2 are not defined in C standard (quoting from
printf(3) manpage):
' For decimal conversion (i, d, u, f, F, g, G) the
output is to be grouped with thousands' grouping
characters if the locale information indicates any.
Note that many versions of gcc cannot parse this
option and will issue a warning. SUSv2 does not
include %'F.
I For decimal integer conversion (i, d, u) the output
uses the locale's alternative output digits, if any
(for example, Arabic digits). However, it does not
include any locale definitions with such outdigits
defined. (glibc 2.2 only)
Example exploit:
printf("%'n", &target);
printf("%In", &target);
2. Libsafe *printf function wrappers incorrectly parse argument indexing
in format strings. They always assume that the n-th conversion
specification uses n-th argument and does not properly count real number
of arguments used. Thus, arguments, whose index numbers are above the
total number of conversion specifications, are not verified at all.
Example exploit:
printf("%2$n", "unused argument", &target);
Total number of % format string used: 1 ("%2$n")
Number of argument used: 2
Fix:
On March 18, 2002 new version of Libsafe 2.0-12 has been released fixing
above security issue.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:cliph@isec.pl> Wojciech
Purczynski.
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