[NEWS] Weak Password Storage in Demarc (Commercial Snort Front-end)

From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 03/02/02


From: support@securiteam.com
To: list@securiteam.com
Date: Sat,  2 Mar 2002 19:03:14 +0100 (CET)

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  Weak Password Storage in Demarc (Commercial Snort Front-end)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

 <http://www.demarc.com> Demarc, the commercial front-end for snort
authenticates users into the front-end via a MySQL database. A security
vulnerability in the product allows attackers to more easily brute force
the password used by the program.

DETAILS

A lack of understanding of DES encryption functions (in this case the perl
'crypt' function) has reduced the password (which is supposed to use
single-DES algorithm) to a weak, effectively 42-bit password. The first
two characters of the password are visible in clear text, making guessing
of the password easier, and of course reducing the effort required for a
brute force attack.

The encrypted password can be viewed by anyone who has read access to the
'snort' database on the machine used to store the Demarc information.
These passwords are stored in the 'dm_sessions' table.

The problem is that the 'salt' required for DES encryption is not used.
Instead, the UNENCRYPTED password is passed as the salt. The upshot of
this is that the first two characters of the password are stored
unencrypted, in the password field (which is meant to contain the salt).
This reduces the DES key length from 8 characters * 7 bits = 56 bits, down
to 6 characters * 7 bits = 42 bits. The valuable 'salt' functionality is
also thrown away.

Example:
Default install of Demarc has

admin user: admin
admin password: my_DEMARC

mysql> use snort
Database changed
mysql> select username, password from dm_sessions where username =
'admin';
+----------+---------------+
| username | password |
+----------+---------------+
| admin | myTaxdrg53/9A |
+----------+---------------+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

You can see the first two characters of the password ('my_DEMARC' -> 'my')
stored in the password field.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by <mailto:demarcprobs@hotmail.com>
demarc probs.

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