[UNIX] DoS Attack Against FreeRADIUS (Other RADIUS Servers Affected)From: email@example.com
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From: email@example.com To: firstname.lastname@example.org Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 15:14:08 +0100 (CET)
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
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DoS Attack Against FreeRADIUS (Other RADIUS Servers Affected)
The <http://www.freeradius.org> FreeRADIUS Server Project is an attempt
to create a high-performance and highly configurable GPL'd RADIUS server.
A security vulnerability in the product allows an attacker to overload the
program with failed requests causing a denial of service attack. Other
RADIUS implementations are suspected to be also vulnerable to the
FreeRADIUS version 0.3 and prior
FreeRADIUS version 0.4
There was a report recently to the maintainers of FreeRADIUS of a DoS
attack against it. For background, FreeRADIUS is a free software RADIUS
authentication, authorization, and accounting server.
The attack was launched from a Nortel Shasta BSN 5000, by a user who
flooded the NAS with PPP requests containing an invalid password, over a
DSL link. All of the PPP requests failed, as when the NAS sent an
Access-Request to the RADIUS server, it responded with an Access-Reject
response, due to the invalid password.
However, the flood of Access-Request packets caused the server to
effectively lock up while the attack was in progress. The system load
during the attack was 60. When the attack stopped, the server resumed its
During the attack, few other users were able to authenticate, as the
server was busy processing the flood of requests from the attack.
The code was subsequently patched so that it would wait for a configurable
time before sending an Access-Reject to the NAS. This change caused the
NAS to ignore any new PPP requests from the problem user, until it
received a response from the RADIUS server. These changes are available in
the current CVS snapshot FreeRADIUS, and will be included in any
Nortel was contacted by the administrator of the NAS under attack, and
their apparent response was that it was not their job to limit RADIUS
FreeRADIUS's examination of other freely available RADIUS implementations
indicates that most, if not all, of them would be vulnerable to the same
attack. Apparently many commercial RADIUS servers are also vulnerable.
Other NAS boxes may also contribute to the problem, by originating
non-rate-limited RADIUS packets.
A decent method of avoiding these problems is to place the RADIUS server
on a protected network, where the traffic to it may be controlled. Dial-up
users should not be able to route packets to the server, and packets from
the Internet should not be routable to the server. If proxying to another
site across the internet is required, then a secure transport protocol
like IPSec should be used.
In such a configuration, the server will be exposed to a minimum of
The information has been provided by <mailto:email@example.com> Alan
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