[UNIX] GnuPG Format String Vulnerability in ttyio.c's do_get()
From: support@securiteam.comDate: 12/17/01
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2001 01:49:10 +0100 (CET)
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GnuPG Format String Vulnerability in ttyio.c's do_get()
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
There is a format string vulnerability in GNU Privacy Guard. By sending a
GPG message with a carefully crafted malicious filename, an attacker may
be able to execute arbitrary code as the user who decrypts the message.
DETAILS
GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) is a free, RFC2440 compliant replacement for
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).
A format string vulnerability occurs in the do_get() function in ttyio.c,
where GnuPG calls tty_printf() with a user supplied format string. When
GPG encounters a filename with an unknown suffix, and is not in batch
mode, it prompts the user for a new filename to write the decrypted
results to. The default value (which is included in the prompt) is the
existing filename. Note that the file name is embedded in the encrypted
message itself, and that safe file names selected by the recipient is not
sufficient to protect against this attack. If the filename embedded in the
message contains printf style format characters, the message creator may
be able to execute arbitrary code as the user who decrypts the message.
Impact:
An attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code as the user decrypting
the message.
Solution:
Apply a patch from your vendor
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by
<mailto:cert@cert.org?Subject=VU%23403051 Feedback> CERT/CC.
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