[UNIX] Vulnerabilities in Several Apache Authentication ModulesFrom: firstname.lastname@example.org
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From: firstname.lastname@example.org To: email@example.com Subject: [UNIX] Vulnerabilities in Several Apache Authentication Modules Message-Id: <20010830161346.32C7D138BF@mail.der-keiler.de> Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2001 18:13:46 +0200 (CEST)
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Vulnerabilities in Several Apache Authentication Modules
RUS-CERT has discovered that several Apache authentication modules that
use SQL databases to store authentication information are vulnerable to a
remote SQL code injection attack.
Any Apache server using database-based authentication with the following
* AuthPG 1.2b2 by Min S. Kim (also known as mod_auth_pg)
* mod_auth_mysql 1.9 by Vivek Khera
* mod_auth_oracle 0.5.1 by Serg Oskin
* mod_auth_pgsql 0.9.5 by Guiseppe Tanzilli and Matthias Eckermann
* mod_auth_pgsql_sys 0.9.4 (by the same authors, modifications by Victor
It is possible that other authentication modules not listed above are
RUS-CERT has examined the following authentication modules and verified
that an Apache server using these modules is not vulnerable to the problem
described in this document:
* mod_auth_mysql 2.20 by Zeev Suraski
* mod_auth_ora7 1.0 by Ben Reser
* mod_auth_ora8 1.0 by Ben Reser
In the case of the PostgreSQL modules, an attacker can execute arbitrary
SQL statements or cause the database query for the password to return
arbitrary data. As a result, unauthorized access to the web server is
With the Oracle module, the attacker can call stored procedures and cause
the database query for the password to return arbitrary data. The impact
with MySQL is currently unclear, but with the advent of stored procedures,
harmful side effects might become possible as well.
SQL code insertion attack
During the authentication process, the password hash has to be looked up
in the database, so a SQL SELECT statement has to be built. In the
vulnerable modules, this is done using code equivalent to the following
Query := Sprintf ("SELECT %s FROM %s WHERE %s = '%s'", Password_Column,
User_Table, User_Column, User);
Later on, the retrieved password hash is compared with the one supplied by
the user trying to authenticate.
However, the value of User has been received over the network. Suppose an
attacker chooses the string (note the single quotation mark at the
'; SELECT 'wA8aGH92dPQnIDD
Now the resulting string contains two SQL statements:
SELECT password_column FROM user_table WHERE user_column = ''; SELECT
PostgreSQL's libpq client library will transmit both statements to the
PostgreSQL server. The server will execute both statements and return the
result of the second to the client. This way, an attacker can make it
appear to the authentication code that the database contains the proper
hash for the password it just has provided. Other forms of attacks are
possible by issuing INSERT or DELETE statements in essentially the same
manner, of course.
In the MySQL and Oracle cases, the impact of the vulnerability is
different. Oracle does not seem to allow multiple SQL statements per
query, but using a UNION clause to add additional data seems to be
possible, so the attack given above can be duplicated. In addition, stored
procedures can be called, with a potential for harmful side effects. There
is no definite answer if the vulnerability is exploitable if a MySQL
database is used, since MySQL supports neither UNION clauses nor stored
RUS-CERT believes that the fact that the essentially the same
vulnerability is present in many PostgreSQL applications is related to the
lack of a suitable string quoting function in the PostgreSQL client
library (and not just to code reuse and overlap among the authors).
Therefore, RUS-CERT proposes that a function that escapes characters
treated specially by the PostgreSQL by replacing them with safe character
sequences is included in the PostgreSQL client library. RUS-CERT provides
a mostly untested sample implementation:
* Escaping Strings in PostgreSQL Queries (
Some of the fixed versions below already implement this suggestion.
MySQL and Oracle
Both the MySQL and Oracle client libraries provide a suitable function for
quoting strings in SQL queries. The authentication modules that are not
vulnerable (see above) use them, so we propose to use these modules, or
the fixed versions below.
Several authors have already reacted and released new versions:
* AuthPG 1.3 by Min S. Kim ( <http://authpg.sourceforge.net/>
* mod_auth_mysql 1.10 by Vivek Khera ( <ftp://ftp.kcilink.com/pub/>
* mod_auth_pgsql 0.9.6 by Guiseppe Tanzilli (
Serg Oskin has announced a fixed version as well.
RUS-CERT contacted the authors of the vulnerable authentication modules on
The information has been provided by
<mailto:Florian.Weimer@RUS.Uni-Stuttgart.DE> Florian Weimer.
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