Re: Remote Windows Kernel Exploitation - Step Into the Ring 0
From: Eirik Schwenke (eirik.schwenke_at_STUDENT.UIB.NO)
Date: 03/09/05
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Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2005 10:20:46 +0100 To: NTBUGTRAQ@LISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM
Den 02/17/05 10:00 skrev Marc Maiffret:
> Remote Windows Kernel Exploitation - Step Into the Ring 0
> http://www.eeye.com/html/resources/whitepapers/research/index.html
Ah, I love the smell of assembler in the morning ;-p But one thing that struck
me, is (how well) do these exploits work on EMT64/AMD64 windows machines with
the no-exec bit enabled ?
Does anyone on this list know if all kernel code is excepted from NX
restrictions by default ? Because surely a utility-function like the keyboard
buffer, or icmp handler should be read-execute only (ie trying to patch it
should throw an exception of some kind) ?
And if the pages are marked read-only, is it possible to patch the error-handler
for that ?
As the NX handling is toggable, it is obvious that some part of the kernel must
be allowed to change it -- and it sounds reasonable that would mean all kernel
code can change it, due to the NT memory model.
Does anyone have more information on this ?
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-- Eirik Schwenke<eirik.schwenke@student.uib.no> http://www.student.uib.no/~st05861 "I can't identify the software needed to play [DVDs] in Linux, but you can probably google for it. You may have to learn Norwegian, though." --Tom Brown in http://linuxgazette.net/issue97/defectors2.html -- NTBugtraq Editor's Note: Most viruses these days use spoofed email addresses. As such, using an Anti-Virus product which automatically notifies the perceived sender of a message it believes is infected may well cause more harm than good. Someone who did not actually send you a virus may receive the notification and scramble their support staff to find an infection which never existed in the first place. Suggest such notifications be disabled by whomever is responsible for your AV, or at least that the idea is considered. --
- Previous message: Marcio Vieira: "Re: LAND attack vulnerability on Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP"
- Next in thread: Maxim S. Shatskih: "Re: Remote Windows Kernel Exploitation - Step Into the Ring 0"
- Reply: Maxim S. Shatskih: "Re: Remote Windows Kernel Exploitation - Step Into the Ring 0"
- Maybe reply: Tony Mason: "Re: Remote Windows Kernel Exploitation - Step Into the Ring 0"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
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