Outlook AutoPreview = Trustworthy Computing = F

From: Russ (Russ.Cooper_at_RC.ON.CA)
Date: 01/03/04

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    Date:         Fri, 2 Jan 2004 22:37:04 -0500
    To: NTBUGTRAQ@LISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM
    
    

    Ok, so I know I harp on this over and over again, and its probably
    getting fairly boring to hear me say, once again, that Microsoft's
    Trustworthy Computing effort gets yet another "F". However, here's a
    good example I stumbled across today that demonstrates why I believe
    Microsoft just doesn't understand what Trustworthiness means.

    I have long recommended that people who use Outlook disable the Preview
    Pane. Granted, over the years, Microsoft has done a great job of
    limiting what Preview Pane can do. There was a time when if you had it
    enabled, and someone sent you a malicious email, it would invoke that
    email even when you weren't present. That's less true today than it was
    in the past...kudos Microsoft.

    However, even today, I still recommend that people keep Preview Pane
    disabled, despite the fact it is still the default for every new folder
    for Outlook. Instead, I recommend that people use AutoPreview.
    AutoPreview is really benign, nothing but plain text is shown, and only
    3 lines of it. If you get an HTML-based email that has no text
    representation (e.g. all scripting), AutoPreview shows you nothing,
    nada, a great way of telling when an email is really worth deleting
    (nothing in AutoPreview, no text in the HTML-based email, please delete
    ASAP.)

    Anyway, so today I'm looking at my logs from my Exchange server and I
    notice a bunch of spam messages that have a whole bunch of "good" words
    in the urn:schemas:httpmail:textdescription of the email. Obviously
    they're trying to fool somebody's Bayesian filter. I look at the same
    message in one of my Outlook folders, and sure enough, AutoPreview shows
    me these "good" words. In my logs, however, I can see that the same
    messages have elaborate urn:schemas:httpmail:htmldescription values.
    Comparing the two shows me that nothing from the
    urn:schemas:httpmail:textdescription is in the
    urn:schemas:httpmail:htmldescription. I look at the message in my
    folder, and then double-click it. Wow, am I surprised.

    What I see in AutoPreview has nothing to do with what I see when I open
    the message. Now I should point out that I have my Outlook configured to
    ReadAsPlain, so there's a Microsoft conversion process being done to the
    urn:schemas:httpmail:htmldescription prior to me seeing the message,
    converting it to plain text.

    I figure that AutoPreview is doing the same conversion, but nooooo....
    AutoPreview is simply showing you whatever is in the
    urn:schemas:httpmail:textdescription of the message. Since that doesn't
    have to have anything to do with what's actually in the
    urn:schemas:httpmail:htmldescription, spammers are filling in both
    header components with completely different stuff.

    The result, viewing an AutoPreview message doesn't necessarily tell you
    anything about the message you're going to see when you actually open it
    in Outlook.

    What's interesting is that MS tells us the default for
    AutoGenerateTextBody is true. This key is supposed to tell Outlook
    whether the urn:schemas:httpmail:textdescription of an email is going to
    be extracted by parsing the urn:schemas:httpmail:htmldescription and
    removing HTML formatting. Despite it being the default, I've yet to see
    any email arrive through an Exchange server where the value is set to
    true. When its not true, the urn:schemas:httpmail:textdescription and
    urn:schemas:httpmail:htmldescription are independent, and need not match
    (or more accurately, have anything to do with each other.)

    http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/wss/wss/_cdo_imessage_autogenera
    tetextbody.asp says that this can happen by design.

    I say this is yet another opportunity for spammers or people phishing to
    lure people into obscuring what you're going to see.

    I say AutoPreview should be a preview of what you will see when you open
    the email. The simple fact that Outlook isn't going to show you what you
    saw in AutoPreview when you open the message means, to me, that
    Microsoft's idea of Trustworthiness is still skewed. See one thing in
    AutoPreview, see something completely different opening the message,
    yah! that will make me trust you.

    I'm going to try modifying my BadURLs script for Exchange servers to set
    AutoGenerateTextBody to True, regardless of how it arrives. For
    99.999999% of emails you receive, this is what you expect to happen
    anyway. Meanwhile, I've also added a component that loops through the
    words in the urn:schemas:httpmail:textdescription and sees if they exist
    in the urn:schemas:httpmail:htmldescription. If the majority don't, its
    a spam message pure and simple.

    Microsoft were informed prior to this posting.

    Cheers,
    Russ - Surgeon General of TruSecure Corporation/NTBugtraq Editor

    p.s. I refer to elements here according to CDO specifications, not RFC
    specifications, since they may or may not be present in environments
    that aren't based on CDO/ADO.

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