Alert: Microsoft Security Bulletin - MS02-065

From: Russ (Russ.Cooper@RC.ON.CA)
Date: 11/20/02

  • Next message: Russ: "Alert: Microsoft Security Bulletin - MS02-066"
    Date:         Wed, 20 Nov 2002 12:30:40 -0500
    From: Russ <Russ.Cooper@RC.ON.CA>
    To: NTBUGTRAQ@LISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM
    
    

    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-065.asp

    Buffer Overrun in Microsoft Data Access Components Could Lead to Code Execution (Q329414)

    Originally posted: November 20, 2002

    Summary

    Who should read this bulletin: Customers using Microsoft® Windows®, particularly those who operate web sites or browse the Internet.

    Impact of vulnerability: Run code of attacker's choice

    Maximum Severity Rating: Critical

    Recommendation: Users should apply the patch immediately.

    Affected Software:
    - Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) 2.1
    - Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) 2.5
    - Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) 2.6
    - Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01
    - Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.5
    - Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0

    Note: The vulnerability does not affect Windows XP, despite the fact that it uses Internet Explorer 6.0. Windows XP customers do not need to take any action.

    End User Bulletin: An end user version of this bulletin is available at: http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/ms02-065.asp

    Technical description:

    Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) is a collection of components used to provide database connectivity on Windows platforms. MDAC is a ubiquitous technology, and it is likely to be present on most Windows systems:
    - It is included by default as part of Windows XP, Windows 2000, and Windows Millennium.
    - It is available for download as a stand-alone technology in its own right
    - It is either included in or installed by a number of other products and technologies. For instance, MDAC is included in the Windows NT® 4.0 Option Pack, and some MDAC components are present as part of Internet Explorer even if MDAC itself is not installed.

    MDAC provides the underlying functionality for a number of database operations, such as connecting to remote databases and returning data to a client. One of the MDAC components, known as Remote Data Services (RDS), provides functionality that support three-tiered architectures - that is, architectures in which a client's requests for service from a back-end database are intermediated through a web site that applies business logic to them. A security vulnerability is present in the RDS implementation, specifically, in a function called the RDS Data Stub, whose purpose it is to parse incoming HTTP requests and generate RDS commands.

     A security vulnerability resulting from an unchecked buffer in the Data Stub affects versions of MDAC prior to version 2.7 (the version that shipped with Windows XP). By sending a specially malformed HTTP request to the Data Stub, an attacker could cause data of his or her choice to overrun onto the heap. Although heap overruns are typically more difficult to exploit than the more-common stack overrun, Microsoft has confirmed that in this case it would be possible to exploit the vulnerability to run code of the attacker's choice on the user's system.

    Both web servers and web clients are at risk from the vulnerability:
    - Web servers are at risk if a vulnerable version of MDAC is installed and running on the server. To exploit the vulnerability against such a web server, an attacker would need to establish a connection with the server and then send a specially malformed HTTP request to it, that would have the effect of overrunning the buffer with the attacker's chosen data. The code would run in the security context of the IIS service (which, by default, runs in the LocalSystem context)
    - Web clients are at risk in almost every case, as the RDS Data Stub is included with all current versions of Internet Explorer and there is no option to disable it. To exploit the vulnerability against a client, an attacker would need to host a web page that, when opened, would send an HTTP reply to the user's system and overrun the buffer with the attacker's chosen data. The web page could be hosted on a web site or sent directly to users as an HTML Mail. The code would run in the security context of the user.

    Clearly, this vulnerability is very serious, and Microsoft recommends that all customers whose systems could be affected by them take appropriate action immediately.

      
    - Customers using Windows XP, or who have installed MDAC 2.7 on their systems are at no risk and do not need to take any action.
    - Web server administrators who are running an affected version of MDAC should either install the patch, disable MDAC and/or RDS, or upgrade to MDAC 2.7, which is not affected by the vulnerability.
    - Web client users who are running an affected version of MDAC should install the patch immediately on any system that is used for web browsing. It is important to stress that the latter guidance applies to any system used for web browsing, regardless of any other protective measures that have already been taken. For instance, a web server on which RDS had been disabled would still need the patch if it was occasionally used as a web client.

    Before deploying the patch, customers should familiarize themselves with the caveats discussed in the FAQ and in the Caveats section below.

    Mitigating factors:

    Web Servers
    - Web servers that are using MDAC version 2.7 (the version that shipped with Windows XP) or later are not aat risk from the vulnerability.
    - Even if a vulnerable version of MDAC were installed, a web server would only be at risk if RDS were enabled. RDS is disabled by default on clean installations of Windows XP and Windows 2000, and can be disabled on other systems by following the guidance in the IIS Security Checklist. In addition, the IIS Lockdown Tool will automatically disable RDS when used in its default configuration.
    - If the URLScan tool were deployed with its default ruleset (which allows only ASCII data to be present in an HTTP request), it is likely that the vulnerability could only be used for denial of service attacks.
    - IIS can be configured to run with fewer than administrative privileges. If this has been done, it would likewise limit the privileges that an attacker could gain through the vulnerability.
    - IP address restrictions, if applied to the RDS virtual directory, could enable the administrator to restrict access to only trusted users. This is, however, not practical for most web server scenarios.

    Web clients
    - Web clients that are using MDAC version 2.7 (the version that shipped with Windows XP) or later are not at risk from the vulnerability.
    - The HTML mail-based attack vector could not be exploited automatically on systems where Outlook 98 or Outlook 2000 were used in conjunction with the Outlook Email Security Update, or Outlook Express 6 or Outlook 2002 were used in their default configurations.
    - Exploiting the vulnerability would convey to the attacker only the user's privileges on the system. Users whose accounts are configured to have few privileges on the system would be at less risk than ones who operate with administrative privileges.

    Vulnerability identifier: CAN-2002-1142

    This email is sent to NTBugtraq automatically as a service to my subscribers. Since its programmatically created, and since its been a long time since anyone paid actual money for my programming skills, it may or may not look that good...;-]

    I can only hope that the information it does contain can be read well enough to serve its purpose.

    Cheers,
    Russ - Surgeon General of TruSecure Corporation/NTBugtraq Editor

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