Re: [Full-disclosure] Arbitrary DDoS PoC



I do not understand why you are wasting time on an obvious troll to
downright, and I don't normally call people names but he well deserves
it, a retard. I think I ironically illustrated the fundamental flaw in
that you can't possibly generate more bandwidth by using proxies for
the python code provided due to it violates the laws of physics
(literally). In fact, if we want to be technical, we could say it is
less effective due to the handshake required to initiate the proxy
connection in fact decreasing efficiency of input compared to input.
If there was something besides making lots of proxy request there
might be something there but it, in fact, has nothing.

Taking into account THN retweeted his FD post and his obvious
inability to understand why everyone is not taking him seriously I
have concluded he is just trying to seek fame and fortune passing off
as some kind of sec expert. Maybe get some brownie points with the
skiddie crowd who wouldn't know better. Throwing fancy terms and
pretending to know what they are talking about doesn't work up against
real researchers who understand what they are doing. Poorly written
scripts also do not impress anyone here considering that I could just
put into google "HTTP Proxy Flooder" and a find superior equivalent
(Even with Point and Click!).

To this effect, I propose we look into Unicorns as a possible
unconventional medium of DDoS due to their mythical properties in a
network environment over-ruled by Pink Lepricons.

Conclusion: Christian Magick.

On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 10:19 AM, Gage Bystrom <themadichib0d@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
If the design is broken than the implementation is broken. Have you READ
your own source code? Do you understand what its actually doing? Rhetorical
questions of course but still.

Your poc calls curl multiple times via a list of proxies. No more, no less.
If you are going to claim that such a thing is an effective general
technique YOU have to back up that claim, not me or anyone else on this
list. I never bothered running it because anyone who read that simple python
code(which was a good thing its simple), can understand what it is doing,
and do a mental comparison to what they previously knew about the subject of
dos. Your poc does not demonstrate anything new, it demonstrates existing
knowledge that is generally known to not be an effective method for dosing
for all the reasons I explained in my previous mails.

I think its quite pedantic of you to only criticize me for calling out the
ineffectiveness of your poc. You did not address anything I or anyone else
said about your claim. If you think I am wrong or mistaken in my personal
assessment of your claim than you are the one who must show how and why to
defend your claim. Belittling someone who criticizes you is not
professional, not productive, does not give strength to your claim, and does
not make you right.

The end of the line is I don't care what you claim your code does, I care
about what the code does, and your code is not an effective general
technique for denial of service attacks.

On Feb 13, 2012 8:48 PM, "Lucas Fernando Amorim" <lf.amorim@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

I could argue that an attack targeted at a service, especially HTTP, is
not measured by the band, but the requests, especially the heavier, could
argue that a technique is the most inherent characteristic of multiple
sources of traffic and still relying on trust. I could still say that is an
implementation that relates only to say - Look, it exists!, I could still
prolong explaining about overheads, and using about the same time many sites
that make the requests, thus reducing the wake of a failure, even if you say
easily diagnosable.

But I'd rather say that it is actually very pedantic of you label
something as inefficient, especially when not done a single test, only the
pedantic observation of someone whose interests it is reprehensible. I will
not say you're one of those, but this is really an attitude typical of this
kind, which is certainly not a hacker. Thanks to people like that, do not
know if you like, there are many flaws yet to be explored.

If anyone wants more information, obviously I will ask to send an email or
call me to give a presentation, I will not think about anything. My goal in
was invited researchers to study DDoS on this model, because anytime someone
can direct thousands to generate a network congestion.


On 13-02-2012 11:17, Gage Bystrom wrote:

Uhh...looks pretty standard boss. You aren't going to DoS a halfway decent
server with that using a single box. Sending your request through multiple
proxies does not magically increase the resource usage of the target, its
still your output power vs their input pipe. Sure it gives a slight boost in
anonymity and obfuscation but does not actually increase effectiveness. It
would even decrease effectiveness because you bear the burden of having to
send to a proxy, giving them ample time to recover from a given request.

Even if you look at it as a tactic to bypass blacklisting, you still
aren't going to overwhelm the server. That means you need more pawns to do
your bidding. This creates a bit of a problem however as then all your
slaves are running through a limited selection of proxies, reducing the
amount of threats the server needs to blacklist. The circumvention is quite
obvious, which is to not utilize proxies for the pawns....and rely on shear
numbers and/or superior resource exhaustion methods....

On Feb 13, 2012 4:37 AM, "Lucas Fernando Amorim" <lf.amorim@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

With the recent wave of DDoS, a concern that was not taken is the model
where the zombies were not compromised by a Trojan. In the standard
modeling of DDoS attack, the machines are purchased, usually in a VPS,
or are obtained through Trojans, thus forming a botnet. But the
arbitrary shape doesn't need acquire a collection of computers.
Programs, servers and protocols are used to arbitrarily make requests on
the target. P2P programs are especially vulnerable, DNS, internet
proxies, and many sites that make requests of user like Facebook or W3C,
also are.

Precisely I made a proof-of-concept script of 60 lines hitting most of
HTTP servers on the Internet, even if they have protections likely
mod_security, mod_evasive. This can be found on this link [1] at GitHub.
The solution of the problem depends only on the reformulation of
protocols and limitations on the number of concurrent requests and
totals by proxies and programs for a given site, when exceeded returning
a cached copy of the last request.

[1] https://github.com/lfamorim/barrelroll

Cheers,
Lucas Fernando Amorim
http://twitter.com/lfamorim

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/