Re: [Full-disclosure] Symlink vulnerabilities
- From: bugs@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 22 Oct 2011 07:54:47 -0400 (EDT)
I apologize as my search wasn't a complex method, just a quick grep for
signs of /tmp misuse. Indeed creating a directory under /tmp is a safeway
to handle tmp files.
bugs@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
bashbug:
/usr/bin/bashbug:TEMPDIR=$TMPDIR/bbug.$$
Maybe I should use bashbug to report a bug in bashbug?
I took a quick look, it's actually using mkdir to create a temporary
directory in /tmp, which it uses for collecting support files.
This is actually a safe way to use /tmp, assuming you check the return
code
of mkdir (which it does). The mkdir() system call behaves very differently
to open(), and is not vulnerable to these attacks.
Tavis.
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