Re: [Full-disclosure] Remote Desktop Command Fixation Attacks

Well, what is your definition of "Security in Depth"?

On Thu, 11 Oct 2007, pdp (architect) wrote:

gboyce, cheers... nice example! although I had something else in mind.
maybe I shouldn't have used the term "security in depth" since your
version differs a bit from mine. I guess different semantics. but yes,
i agree that systems, processes, data, etc needs to be separated and
blended into a balanced mix which as you said, while under attack, it
does not give away the keys to the kingdom.


On 10/11/07, gboyce <gboyce@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Thu, 11 Oct 2007, pdp (architect) wrote:

Thor, with no disrespect but you are wrong. Security in depth does not
work and I am not planning to support my argument in any way. This is
just my personal humble opinion. I've seen only failure of the
principles you mentioned. Security in depth works only in a perfect
world. The truth is that you cannot implement true security mainly
because you will hit on the accessibility side. It is all about
achieving the balance between security and accessibility. Moreover,
you cannot implement security in depth mainly because you cannot
predict the future. Therefore, you don't know what kinds of attack
will surface next.

Security is not a destination, it is a process. Security in depth
sounds like a destination to me.

The reason for security in depth is precisely because no security controls
are foolproof. The point isn't to make a system completely unbreakable,
but to raise the bar for what is required in order to extend their access
beyond what they already control.

Lets take a webserver as an example.

Your webserver only requires ports 80 and 443 listening to the world, so
you deploy a firewall in front of it restricting access to just those

A default install of the OS may enable a few other processes bound to
remote ports like a mail server, portmap, etc. These processes aren't
needed on this particular system. The firewall blocks access to them, but
firewalls aren't perfect. The attacker may have found a way to get behind
it. So you turn off those unneeded services.

Being a webserver, its running a number of web applications. Since you
don't want to place more trust in those applications than you have to, you
chroot apache and have it run as a non-privledged user. Hopefully this
will contain a successful compromise.

But still, the attacker may break out of the chroot, so you make sure that
you remove setuid applications or at least keep them up to date with the
latest security updates. You do your best to keep them from becoming
root. But even that may fail.

Assuming all else has failed, this system is completely owned. But you
have other systems with even more sensitive information. So you architect
your network such that this webserver does not have more network
prilvedges than it needs. You filter outbound network connections to
hopefully block a good portion of botnet command and control functions.
You block access from this webserver to other systems unless they have a
need to talk to them. You implement application level firewalls between
it and services that it does need to talk to.

THIS is defence is depth. Its not about perfect security. Its about
containing breaches. Its about blocking unnecessary risks. Its about
making sure that a small mistake that you make does not hand over the keys
to the kingdom.


pdp (architect) | petko d. petkov

Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia -