Re: [Full-disclosure] NETRAGARD-20060624 SECURITY ADVISORY] [ROXIO TOAST 7 TITANIUM - LOCAL ROOT COMPROMISE ]
- From: "K F (lists)" <kf_lists@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2006 09:25:18 -0400
I am going to have to disagree... the admin users on OS X can NOT become root at any time. The admin user must first know the admin password before becoming root.
Simple example... I walk into your office and your mac is logged in as admin. If I try to do any admin level tasks like add a user or install software (into system folders) I must first authenticate. If I don't know your password then sorry about my luck.
Based on the info below ANYONE that sits down at your pc while it is logged in can take advantage of the fact that you can take root WITHOUT a password using the technique outlined below.
Don't act like you have never let someone use a web browser or log into instant messenger on your computer before...
Heck I may go down to the apple store and take root on one of the demo machines that has 20 bajillion software apps instaled on it for me to try before I buy. Chances are the machines are logged in as admin... chances are they (folks at Apple store) feel safe because I don't know the password.... chances are they are mistaken ... just like you.
-KF
Propaganda Support wrote:
Hello list members,
I don't consider this to be a legitimate exploit at all, since admin privileges are required to access the Deja Vu preference pane. (It's locked for standard users.) And, of course, any admin user on OS X can become root at any time:
% sudo su
Password:
godard:/tmp root# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel), 1(daemon), 2(kmem), 3(sys), 4(tty), 29(certusers), 8(procview), 5(operator), 9(procmod), 80(admin), 20(staff)
The "attack" depends primarily on the ability to prepend /tmp to $PATH, as shown in this part of Step 2:
netragard-test-1$export PATH=/tmp/:$PATH
Even if there is a malicious 'rm' program (for example) sitting inside of /tmp, the 'export' command can only change the $PATH environment variable to prepend /tmp within the current account (actually, only within the current shell session).
In other words, if the "attacker" already has an admin user name and password required to use Deja Vu, then they already have the means to become root at any time (see 'sudo su' above).
Kind Regards,
-jeff
--Jeff Holland
http://propagandaprod.com
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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Propaganda Support wrote:
Hello list members,
I don't consider this to be a legitimate exploit at all, since admin privileges are required to access the Deja Vu preference pane. (It's locked for standard users.) And, of course, any admin user on OS X can become root at any time:
% sudo su
Password:
godard:/tmp root# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel), 1(daemon), 2(kmem), 3(sys), 4(tty), 29(certusers), 8(procview), 5(operator), 9(procmod), 80(admin), 20(staff)
The "attack" depends primarily on the ability to prepend /tmp to $PATH, as shown in this part of Step 2:
netragard-test-1$export PATH=/tmp/:$PATH
Even if there is a malicious 'rm' program (for example) sitting inside of /tmp, the 'export' command can only change the $PATH environment variable to prepend /tmp within the current account (actually, only within the current shell session).
In other words, if the "attacker" already has an admin user name and password required to use Deja Vu, then they already have the means to become root at any time (see 'sudo su' above).
Kind Regards,
-jeff
--Jeff Holland
http://propagandaprod.com
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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