[Full-disclosure] NETRAGARD-20060624 SECURITY ADVISORY] [ROXIO TOAST 7 TITANIUM - LOCAL ROOT COMPROMISE ]
- From: Propaganda Support <support@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2006 10:39:06 +0200
Hello list members,
I don't consider this to be a legitimate exploit at all, since admin privileges are required to access the Deja Vu preference pane. (It's locked for standard users.) And, of course, any admin user on OS X can become root at any time:
% sudo su
Password:
godard:/tmp root# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel), 1(daemon), 2(kmem), 3(sys), 4(tty), 29(certusers), 8(procview), 5(operator), 9(procmod), 80 (admin), 20(staff)
The "attack" depends primarily on the ability to prepend /tmp to $PATH, as shown in this part of Step 2:
netragard-test-1$export PATH=/tmp/:$PATH
Even if there is a malicious 'rm' program (for example) sitting inside of /tmp, the 'export' command can only change the $PATH environment variable to prepend /tmp within the current account (actually, only within the current shell session).
In other words, if the "attacker" already has an admin user name and password required to use Deja Vu, then they already have the means to become root at any time (see 'sudo su' above).
Kind Regards,
-jeff
--
Jeff Holland
http://propagandaprod.com
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
- Follow-Ups:
- Prev by Date: Re: [Full-disclosure] further to the XSS flaw in eEye by Valerie Marchuk
- Next by Date: Re: [Full-disclosure] NETRAGARD-20060624 SECURITY ADVISORY] [ROXIO TOAST 7 TITANIUM - LOCAL ROOT COMPROMISE ]
- Previous by thread: [Full-disclosure] NETRAGARD-20060624 SECURITY ADVISORY] [ROXIO TOAST 7 TITANIUM - LOCAL ROOT COMPROMISE ]
- Next by thread: Re: [Full-disclosure] NETRAGARD-20060624 SECURITY ADVISORY] [ROXIO TOAST 7 TITANIUM - LOCAL ROOT COMPROMISE ]
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|
