Re: [Full-disclosure] Defeating Citi-Bank Virtual Keyboard Protection

From: Bart Lansing (bart.lansing_at_hushmail.com)
Date: 08/08/05

  • Next message: Nicob: "RE: [Full-disclosure] Defeating Citi-Bank Virtual Keyboard Protection"
    Date: Mon,  8 Aug 2005 07:37:57 -0700
    To: <adityad2005@users.sourceforge.net>, <lyal.collins@key2it.com.au>
    
    

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    On Sat, 06 Aug 2005 13:40:40 -0700 root
    <lyal.collins@key2it.com.au> wrote:
    >Aditya Deshmukh wrote:
    >
    >>The only most secure protection is a one time password with a
    >challenge /
    >>response scheme. Most of the banks in europe already do this.
    >>
    >>They give out a calculator like device to the customers and when
    >u want to
    >>login you are presented with a challenge that you punch into you
    >device
    >>which spits a response that you enter that into the form....
    >>
    >>Costly for the bank but very effective security for the customer
    >and bank in
    >>terms of gain in security and decrease in losses due to fraud
    >....
    >>
    >>
    >>- Aditya
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>__________________________________________________________________

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    >>
    >>
    >>
    >Respectfully, I disagree.
    >Although I never attended, this year's IT Underground conference
    >in
    >poland promised a hand on session breaking OTP tokens. As
    >Schneier
    >says, OT token device merely force a tactical shift by the
    >attacker, not
    >a permanent fix.
    >The credit card industry's 'fixes' have only been effective for
    >weeks to
    >months over the past decade, so I don't consider OTPs will make
    >much
    >difference relative to the cost in the mid-long term.
    >
    >Lyal
    >_______________________________________________
    >Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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    There is no permanent security fix...for anything. Every system
    that exists today will be vulnerable tomorrow, and every measure to
    secure them that exists today will be thought to be old-school and
    simplistic in a decade (probably much sooner, I'm allowing wiggle
    room).

    Starting from that point, with all due respect to Mr. Schneier as
    parahphrased by Lyal, OTP tokens/two factor in general, while not
    perfect, are light years beyond "Hey, type your password into this
    webform for us, and we'll pull up your bank account." in terms of
    doing what matters...securing the customer. Today. Not some
    nebulous tomorrow where we all rest our finger on the passive DNA
    scanner built into whatever user interface device we are using at
    the time (and that will no doubt be vulnerable to man in the middle
    attacks using DNA Dictionaries).

    The Game is not "Can you make it permanently secure?"...you can't.
    The Game is "Given the resources we have today (technical, fiscal,
    human, physical, etc), how secure can we make systems that are at
    risk and are appropriate to take such measures for?". Planning for
    tomorrow while offering critiques of today's solutions is
    great...and it will make tomorrow a better/safer place for our
    data. But right now we have to make do with what's both available
    and realistically achievable. OTPs are both.

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  • Next message: Nicob: "RE: [Full-disclosure] Defeating Citi-Bank Virtual Keyboard Protection"

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