[Full-disclosure] Re: Full-Disclosure Digest, Vol 5, Issue 43
From: Tanvir (tanvirlodi_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 07/19/05
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Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2005 04:38:09 -0700 (PDT) To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Hi,
This is interesting. We are using a Proxy server but it ask for NTLM authorization. Any other software i try to use apart from Microsoft products the error comes up for example if i use HTTRACK software it says :-
16:18:32 Warning: Cache: damaged cache, trying to repair
16:18:32 Warning: Cache: 0 bytes successfully recovered in 0 entries
16:18:32 Error: "Proxy Authentication Required" (407) at link www.yahoo.com/ (from primary/primary)
16:18:32 Info: No data seems to have been transfered during this session! : restoring previous one!
They say this is due to NTLM authorization problem. Even if i supply the user name and password to the software still it is not working.
Proxy is 172.16.0.1 with port 8080. I also tried to tunnel through HTTP but to no avail. Before they invoke the NTLM authorization, HTTRACK was working fine.
Any ideas?
Warm regards,
Tanvir.
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: NTLM HTTP Authentication is insecure by design - a new
writeup by Amit Klein (3APA3A)
2. Re: Advice RE Site Exploit (Mike Hoye)
From: 3APA3A <3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>
CC: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
To: "Amit Klein (AKsecurity)" <aksecurity@hotpop.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2005 13:13:03 +0400
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] NTLM HTTP Authentication is insecure by design - a new writeup by Amit Klei
Dear Amit Klein (AKsecurity),
NTLM authentication is insecure by design for external authentication,
because of "single signon" ideology. NTLM authentication can be used
for NTLM proxy attack. For example, attacker who can hijack or spoof
server connection with NTLM authentication can use this connection to
access different Web server, mail server or file server with client's
privileges. This is known for many years and was discussed for many
times. Internet Explorer uses NTLM authentication by default only for
local network zone. Local network zone (by default) are hosts with
NetBIOS names (for exampel WEBSRV), this hosts are excluded from proxy
by dafault, and exclusion list for proxy is also part of local network.
So, in default configuration, NTLM will never be used through proxy
server.
--Monday, July 18, 2005, 9:43:02 PM, you wrote to full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk:
AKA> NTLM HTTP Authentication
AKA> (and possibly other connection-oriented
AKA> HTTP authentication and authorization protocols)
AKA> is insecure by design
AKA> Or
AKA> NTLM Authentication and HTTP proxies
AKA> don't mix
AKA> Amit Klein, July 2005
AKA> Introduction
AKA> ============
AKA> In "Meanwhile on the other side of the webserver"
AKA> (http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/401866) I surveyed some
AKA> possible attacks against a scenario wherein a proxy server is
AKA> positioned in front of a web server, and that proxy server shares a
AKA> single TCP connection to the server among several clients. In that
AKA> write-up, I mentioned several problems related to HTTP Request
AKA> Smuggling
AKA> (http://www.watchfire.com/resources/HTTP-Request-Smuggling.pdf) and
AKA> HTTP Response Splitting
AKA> (http://www.sanctuminc.com/pdf/WhitePaper_HTTPResponse.pdf). These
AKA> are attacks that make use of non-RFC HTTP requests (HTTP Request
AKA> Smuggling) or inject unexpected data (CRLF) through the application
AKA> into the HTTP response stream (HTTP Response Splitting). In contrast,
AKA> this write-up discusses a completely different problem, one which is
AKA> inherent to the situation of a connection-oriented authentication/
AKA> authorization protocol (e.g. NTLM authentication) used with a proxy
AKA> server that shares TCP connections among several clients. Exploiting
AKA> this vulnerability can be performed with 100% RFC compliant HTTP
AKA> requests, and without attacking the application (i.e. without sending
AKA> malicious data to the application).
AKA> Theory
AKA> ======
AKA> In connection oriented security, the authentication is associated
AKA> with the TCP connection, rather than to the individual HTTP requests
AKA> it transports. As a result, a proxy server that shares a TCP
AKA> connection to the server among 2 clients may jeopardize the security
AKA> of the web application by sending a first request (or a set of
AKA> requests) with authentication/authorization credentials from the
AKA> first client, followed by a request with no credentials from the
AKA> second client, and have the web server associate the privileges of
AKA> the first request with the second request.
AKA> NTLM authentication is an example to such connection-oriented
AKA> security scheme.
>>From http://curl.haxx.se/rfc/ntlm.html#ntlmHttpAuthentication
AKA> (lacking official Microsoft specification, this resource is one of
AKA> the most comprehensive descriptions of NTLM authentication):
AKA> This [HTTP NTLM authentication] scheme differs from most "normal"
AKA> HTTP authentication mechanisms, in that subsequent requests over
AKA> the authenticated connection are not themselves authenticated;
AKA> NTLM is connection-oriented, rather than request-oriented. So a
AKA> second request for "/index.html" would not carry any
AKA> authentication information, and the server would request none.
AKA> This attack is possible because:
AKA> 1. Proxy servers share the same TCP connection to the server, among
AKA> several clients. This enables several attacks (on top of the one
AKA> described here), as discussed in "Meanwhile, on the other side of
AKA> the web server".
AKA> 2. Connection-oriented security is an insecure concept because
AKA> there's no guarantee in the HTTP RFC that a single connection will
AKA> be used by a single entity. As can be seen, this simply doesn't
AKA> hold. Note that SSL is not connection-oriented security since each
AKA> request is encrypted with a secret, shared key, making this protocol
AKA> implicitly request-oriented.
AKA> Results
AKA> =======
AKA> I tested this security issue with Microsoft IIS/6.0 (as the web
AKA> server that requires NTLM authentication – "Integrated Windows
AKA> Authentication" in Microsoft's IIS GUI terminology) and Sun
AKA> Microsystems Sun Java System Web Proxy 4 (as the proxy server that
AKA> shares TCP connections to the same server).
AKA> There are some tricky points in making this attack work:
AKA> 1. Microsoft IE 6.0 refuses to conduct NTLM authentication when it
AKA> is configured to use a forward proxy. Therefore, the setup used was
AKA> with the Sun Proxy as a reverse proxy.
AKA> 2. Microsoft IIS/6.0 does not induce the authentication level of a
AKA> request to the whole connection, if the HTTP request contains the
AKA> Via header. The Sun Proxy server sends this header by default (is
AKA> there a way to turn this off?), and so, in order to strip it off, an
AKA> Apache 2.0.54 reverse proxy server (with ProxyVia Block directive)
AKA> was introduced between the Sun Proxy server and the IIS server.
AKA> After these tweaks, both IE 6.0 and Mozilla 1.4 were used to
AKA> demonstrate the attack:
AKA> In the first step, a browser was used to authenticate to the IIS/6.0
AKA> (through the Sun Proxy and the Apache proxy). The authentication was
AKA> done in NTLM. Since the Apache proxy removed the Via header, the
AKA> IIS/6.0 induced the authentication credentials on the whole TCP
AKA> connection.
AKA> In the second step, a different client was used to access a
AKA> restricted resource on the IIS/6.0 through the Sun proxy (and the
AKA> Apache proxy). The Sun Proxy used the same TCP connection to the
AKA> Apache as it used for the first request, and likewise, the Apache
AKA> used the same connection to the IIS/6.0 as it used for the first
AKA> request, and therefore the credentials of the first request were
AKA> successfully induced onto the second request, although it arrived
AKA> from a different client on a different TCP connection (from the
AKA> client to the Sun Proxy).
AKA> Scope of the attack
AKA> ===================
AKA> *) Not all proxy servers honor NTLM authentication. Squid, for one,
AKA> deliberately doesn't support NTLM
AKA> (http://www.squid-cache.org/Doc/FAQ/FAQ-11.html#ss11.14). Indeed,
AKA> Squid seems to strip off the WWW-Authenticate header if it contains
AKA> NTLM or Negotiate, thereby effectively disabling NTLM authentication
AKA> between the client and the web server. But as mentioned above, there
AKA> are some proxy servers that do support NTLM authentication, such as
AKA> Sun Proxy 4.
AKA> *) Not all proxy servers share TCP connection to the server. Many
AKA> do,some don't (e.g. Apache 2.0 mod_proxy).
AKA> *) If IE is to be tricked, then it mustn't be configured with a
AKA> forward proxy server. That means that the attack is effective for IE
AKA> (only) with transparent proxy servers (such as ones used by many
AKA> ISPs), and reverse proxy servers (as demonstrated above). The
AKA> Mozilla browser has no such inhibitions, and therefore, a Mozilla
AKA> shop (e.g. some universities and open source organizations) may be
AKA> more vulnerable.
AKA> *) The web server (IIS/6.0) must receive a Via-less request. The
AKA> Microsoft implementation assumes that the Via header is always sent
AKA> by a proxy server, and this is indeed mandated by the HTTP/1.1 RFC
AKA> 2616 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt), section 14.45:
AKA> The Via general-header field MUST be used by gateways and proxies
AKA> to indicate the intermediate protocols and recipients between the
AKA> user agent and the server on requests [...]
AKA> However, it seems that not all servers adhere to this standard. For
AKA> example, Apache 2.0.54 mod_proxy does not generate a Via header by
AKA> default (see the ProxyVia directive -
AKA> http://httpd.apache.org/docs-2.0/mod/mod_proxy.html#proxyvia, yet
AKA> the default httpd.conf file contains a commented-out "ProxyVia On"
AKA> directive, so it's possible that many Apache proxy deployments do
AKA> send the Via header). That isn't to say that Apache 2.0.54 mod_proxy
AKA> facilitates this attack – as mentioned above, it does not, because
AKA> it does not share the connection to the server among several clients.
AKA> Anyway, there are many "anonymous" proxy servers in the Internet,
AKA> which deliberately do not send the Via header, ironically with the
AKA> intention to increase the privacy of their users. And there are many
AKA> other devices and configurations that may remove the Via header if
AKA> it exists (in the above example, I introduced the Apache proxy
AKA> server to do just that).
AKA> *) Last but not least - NTLM authentication should be used, and over
AKA> HTTP (not over HTTPS). This is the default configuration of
AKA> Microsoft Outlook Web Access 2000/2003.
AKA> Recommendations
AKA> ===============
AKA> *) Proxy vendors – do not to share TCP connections to the server
AKA> among several clients. Yes, it improves performance, but it's also
AKA> insecure and enables/aids 3 different attacks (the one described
AKA> here, HTTP Request Smuggling and HTTP Response Splitting).
AKA> Also, comply to the RFC and send the HTTP Via request header by
AKA> default (Apache Group - please take note).
AKA> *) Designers of protocols past, present and future – do not rely on
AKA> TCP connection being used by a single logical entity. As a special
AKA> case, NTLM should be withdrawn or redesigned (OK, this won't
AKA> happen...). Also, do not rely on the Via header (or any other
AKA> header) to indicate that the client is a proxy server. Design the
AKA> protocol such that it will be indifferent to whether the client is a
AKA> proxy server or a browser.
AKA> *) Site owners – abandon NTLM authentication in favor of other
AKA> authentication/authorization options (e.g. HTTP digest
AKA> authentication – see RFC 2617 –
AKA> http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2617.txt).
AKA> Alternatively, use NTLM over HTTPS (SSL) to avoid this
AKA> vulnerability, but make sure that the SSL is terminated on the web
AKA> server, not some SSL accelerator (which may in itself facilitate the
AKA> attack, e.g. if it shares a TCP connection to the server among
AKA> several clients).
AKA> Another alternative is to configure the web server not to use
AKA> persistent HTTP connections for resources that are protected by NTLM
AKA> autnehtication.
AKA> *) Proxy owners – in order to protect your clients and your clients'
AKA> privacy: do not turn off generating the "Via" HTTP request header by
AKA> the proxy server. True, it indicates that the request comes from a
AKA> proxy server, but in the case of NTLM authentication, it increases
AKA> the likelihood of the client not to be subject to the attack
AKA> described here. If possible, turn off TCP connection sharing in your
AKA> proxy server. If none of this is possible, consider actively
AKA> disrupting NTLM authentication, in order to force your clients to
AKA> use other (hopefully more secure) authentication methods.
AKA> A note about detection/prevention
AKA> =================================
AKA> Since the attacker's request is practically identical to the request
AKA> sent by the authenticated user, it's quite a problem for an external
AKA> product (such as IDS/IPS/WAF) to detect this attack.
AKA> Of course, if the IDS/IPS/WAF is between the web-server and the proxy,
AKA> it stands very little chance to detect that something's wrong, since
AKA> the attacker's request is practically identical to the valid user's
AKA> requests. However, it can block the attack simply by (gracefully, if
AKA> possible) closing the TCP connection after a successful response (i.e.
AKA> not 401) for a request containing NTLM authentication.
AKA> If the proxy server is on site, and the IDS/IPS/WAF is in front
AKA> of it, then protection becomes harder – the IDS/IPS/WAF would have to
AKA> replace the NTLM authentication of the server with its own, and
AKA> practically replicate the logic from the web-server to itself, in
AKA> order to ensure that a request without credentials is made only to a
AKA> resource which is public.
AKA> It's also not too trivial to automatically scan for this kind of
AKA> vulnerability. A scanner would have to be positioned in front of the
AKA> proxy server (which may be away from the site), and would have to
AKA> simulate the attack using two TCP connections.
AKA> A note about basic authentication in IIS/5.0
AKA> ============================================
AKA> If memory serves, and peculiarly enough, awhile ago Ronen Heled,
AKA> Chaim Linhart and me bumped into an implementation quirk of IIS/5.0
AKA> wherein HTTP basic authentication seems to be also connection
AKA> oriented, that is, if the TCP connection had already transmitted an
AKA> HTTP request with valid Authorization header, the credentials are
AKA> used for the next requests (on this TCP connection) even if these do
AKA> not contain the Authorization header. Here too, the presence of the
AKA> Via HTTP request header turns off the connection-orientedness.
AKA> Again – this is something we noted awhile ago as a byproduct of a
AKA> research in a different direction, and since I have no solid
AKA> evidence, I am reluctant to point at it as a vulnerability. If
AKA> someone can verify this on IIS/5.0 (I didn't manage to replicate it
AKA> on IIS/6.0), please step foreward...
AKA> _______________________________________________
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-- ~/ZARAZA Íåïðèÿòíîñòè íà÷íóòñÿ â âîñåìü. (Òâåí) From: Mike Hoye <mhoye@neon.polkaroo.net> CC: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk To: David Wilde <cdwilde@gmail.com> Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2005 22:12:40 -0400 Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Advice RE Site Exploit On Mon, Jul 18, 2005 at 05:22:41PM -0700, David Wilde wrote: > > What is the best way of informing the company of my > discovery and my wishes with the ultimate goal of 1) not going to jail > being labeled a terrorist and threat to national security, and 2) > getting what I want? Doing the right thing means you don't get what you want; that's what doing the right thing _is_. -- "If we can't think for ourselves, if we're unwilling to question authority, then we're just putty in the hands of those in power." - Carl Sagan _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ The Intelligent Man who is proud of his intelligence is like a condenmed Man who is proud of his large cell. http://www.brainbench.com/transcript.jsp?pid=3840075 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/woc2k2/ http://spaces.msn.com/members/1tanvir/ http://resumes.hotjobs.com/tanvirlodi/tanvir http://turbulence.org/spotlight/thinking/chess.html --------------------------------- Start your day with Yahoo! - make it your home page
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