[Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 200507-11 ] MIT Kerberos 5: Multiple vulnerabilities

From: Sune Kloppenborg Jeppesen (jaervosz_at_gentoo.org)
Date: 07/12/05

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    Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200507-11
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                                                http://security.gentoo.org/
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      Severity: High
         Title: MIT Kerberos 5: Multiple vulnerabilities
          Date: July 12, 2005
          Bugs: #98799
            ID: 200507-11

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    Synopsis
    ========

    MIT Kerberos 5 is vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack and remote
    execution of arbitrary code, possibly leading to the compromise of the
    entire Kerberos realm.

    Background
    ==========

    MIT Kerberos 5 is the free implementation of the Kerberos network
    authentication protocol by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

    Affected packages
    =================

        -------------------------------------------------------------------
         Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
        -------------------------------------------------------------------
      1 app-crypt/mit-krb5 < 1.4.1-r1 >= 1.4.1-r1

    Description
    ===========

    Daniel Wachdorf discovered that MIT Kerberos 5 could corrupt the heap
    by freeing unallocated memory when receiving a special TCP request
    (CAN-2005-1174). He also discovered that the same request could lead to
    a single-byte heap overflow (CAN-2005-1175). Magnus Hagander discovered
    that krb5_recvauth() function of MIT Kerberos 5 might try to
    double-free memory (CAN-2005-1689).

    Impact
    ======

    Although exploitation is considered difficult, a remote attacker could
    exploit the single-byte heap overflow and the double-free vulnerability
    to execute arbitrary code, which could lead to the compromise of the
    whole Kerberos realm. A remote attacker could also use the heap
    corruption to cause a Denial of Service.

    Workaround
    ==========

    There are no known workarounds at this time.

    Resolution
    ==========

    All MIT Kerberos 5 users should upgrade to the latest available
    version:

        # emerge --sync
        # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=app-crypt/mit-krb5-1.4.1-r1"

    References
    ==========

      [ 1 ] CAN-2005-1174
            http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1174
      [ 2 ] CAN-2005-1175
            http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1175
      [ 3 ] CAN-2005-1689
            http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1689
      [ 4 ] MITKRB5-SA-2005-002
            http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2005-002-kdc.txt
      [ 5 ] MITKRB5-SA-2005-003
            http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2005-003-recvauth.txt

    Availability
    ============

    This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
    the Gentoo Security Website:

      http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200507-11.xml

    Concerns?
    =========

    Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
    confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
    importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
    security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
    http://bugs.gentoo.org.

    License
    =======

    Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
    belongs to its owner(s).

    The contents of this document are licensed under the
    Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

    http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0

    
    

    
    

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