[Full-disclosure] Re: Publishing exploit code - what is it good for

From: John Horn (John.Horn_at_tucsonaz.gov)
Date: 06/30/05

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    Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2005 10:40:37 -0700
To: <aviram@beyondsecurity.com>, <full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk>, <bugtraq@securityfocus.com>

    As the security officer for our organization, I find full disclosure
    to be an indispensable part of our software selection process. Software
    that has not been thoroughly examined and tested is considered strongly
    suspect by our organization and is not likely to find its way to our
    short
    list.

    Without the exploit code, we have only some unknown person's suggestion
    that the software is vulnerable. Without the code, it becomes difficult
    to
    discern the difference between a legitimate exploit and someone's
    personal
    bias against a particular company or software package.

    With the exploit code we can independently verify the vulnerability -
    thus
    increasing our internal confidence in the opinions of the researcher and

    the researcher's organization (if any).

    The code is indispensable. Period.
     
     
     
    >>>Aviram Jenik <aviram@beyondsecurity.com> 06/30 6:13 am >>>
    Hi,
     
    I recently had a discussion about the concept of full disclosure with
    one of
    the top security analysts in a well-known analyst firm. Their claim was
    that
    companies that release exploit code (like us, but this is also relevant
    for
    bugtraq, full disclosure, and several security research firms) put users
    at
    risks while those at risk gain nothing from the release of the exploit.
     
    I tried the regular 'full disclosure advocacy' bit, but the analyst
    remained
    reluctant. Their claim was that based on their own work experience, a
    security administrator does not have a need for the exploit code itself,
    and
    the vendor information is enough. The analyst was willing to reconsider
    their
    position if an end-user came forward and talked to them about their own
    benefit of public exploit codes. Quote: " If I speak to an end-user
    organization and they express legitimate needs for exploit code, then
    I'll
    change my opinion."
     
    Help me out here. Full disclosure is important for me, as I'm sure it is
    for
    most of the people on these two lists. If you're an end-user
    organization and
    are willing to talk to this analyst and explain your view (pro-FD, I
    hope),
    drop me a note and I'll put you in direct contact.
     
    Please note: I don't need any arguments pro or against full disclosure;
    all
    this has been discussed in the past. I also don't need you to tell me
    about
    someone else or some other project (e.g. nessus, snort) that utilizes
    these
    exploits. Tried that. Didn't work.
     
    What I need is a security administrator, CSO, IT manager or sys admin
    that can
    explain why they find public exploits are good for THEIR organizations.
    Maybe
    we can start changing public opinion with regards to full disclosure,
    and
    hopefully start with this opinion leader.
     
    TIA.
      

    -- 
Aviram Jenik 
Beyond Security 
 
http://www.BeyondSecurity.com 
http://www.SecuriTeam.com 
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