RE: [Full-disclosure] RE: [ISN] How To Save The Internet

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Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 15:41:01 -0500
To: <Arndt.WA@forces.gc.ca>, <jasonc@science.org>, <gillettdavid@fhda.edu>, <jericho@attrition.org>

The point might be better made here that we have many security models
that assume that whatever runs on a box is run at the behest of the
person using the box. In reality lots of what runs (particularly
mobile code but there exist many examples) is not running as the agent
of the box owner nor of the person using the box (who may be the
same, maybe not). They are in effect independent agents, but not humans.

Logically they should be controllable and should have access controls
a box owner may assign so that their access permissions are granted
as one might grant a guest, hostile alien, mad dog, best friend,
employee, or whatnot. I see VERY few cases where anyone in the industry
(security or computer) has taken this seriously.

That a consumer might prefer to buy only a system where he can make all
these decisions is a related issue. (Ditto for corporations.) Also whether
the current legal morass over intellectual property is of social value
is another issue.

That the need to recognize the existence of multiple subjects of very
different trust levels in a computer system exists, is clear. The number
of systems that do so is not so large as is needed.

A heritage of systems designed as multi-user from the get-go should help
support such distinctions (as a single-user design heritage may not) because
more subsystems will be designed expecting to be able to run in isolated
and non-God-privileged accounts. Still, over-reliance on accounts running as
"local system" or "root" or the like undermines such separation, and while
there have been a number of attempts at identifying autonomous code (including
some of my own), there's certainly not much of that kind of control in
popular OS releases.

Nor is there much up-front discussion for consumers of what they can control,
what someone wants to control in spite of them, and what choices they
need to exert.

One last bit: I have seen numerous cases, where companies were providing
supposedly secure and needed subsystems whose control they did not want
their users touching, where such systems caused chaos or totally undermined
system security. This was not only on PCs; various model mainframes,
including IBM, were involved in some of the horror stories. As a result I
feel very uncomfortable about a notion that someone wants control over my
computer, which can function despite all I may do, to run his private code.
Once bitten, twice shy. Or should I say: "fool me once, shame on you. Fool
me twice, shame on me." ?

Glenn Everhart

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-bounces@lists.grok.org.uk
[mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@lists.grok.org.uk]On Behalf Of
Arndt.WA@forces.gc.ca
Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2005 11:24 AM
To: jasonc@science.org; gillettdavid@fhda.edu; jericho@attrition.org
Cc: sberinato@cio.com; full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk; isn@c4i.org;
bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: [Full-disclosure] RE: [ISN] How To Save The Internet

Jason Coombs wrote:
>
> David Gillett wrote:
> > are the various rights of the owner
> > of the CPU, the *operator* of the
> > CPU, and the owner of the *data*,
> > each of whom may have a more or
> > less legitimate say in what code
> > actually gets executed.
>
> Nonsense. Absurd, ridiculous nonsense.
>
> There is only one party who has any say over what code gets
> executed by a CPU: the owner of that physical property.
>
> Everyone else can go fly a kite.

Hold on. If you're dealing with a large company or government
department, who "physically owns" the computer in question,
you can't tell me that they're going to micromanage exactly
what goes on with that system. They'll delegate the authority
off to someone who'll actually run the equipment. That sounds
like an "*operator* of the CPU" to me...
>
> Take your intellectual property fantasies and your heady
> legal concerns to law school, they have no place in security
> technology.

I don't read "intellectual property" anywhere in David's
position at all. He quite rightly separates the three obvious
stakeholders in any computer system, be it a desktop or a huge
data storage facility.

When you're dealing with a system that's primary function is
serving up reams of data (say a database), the access to that
data will involve someone running "code" (read: an application).
This access cannot be controlled solely by the maintainer of the
computer(s) and other equipment that make up the DB. Similarly,
isn't going to be the DBA, who's role is to maintain the data
contained in the DB, either. In this example, a user running
queries against that DB is exercising control and most certainly
has a "say in what code actually gets executed" as a result. I
don't think I need to point out that this user could even be
someone external to your organisation, but I will anyway...
>
<Snip out Intellectual Property driven rant>

I'm not trying to flame or troll here. I just think that in
the world we live in now, where computers (and the CPUs they
contain) are "operated" by various stakeholders, it is a hard
sell to say that only one entity controls the resources in
question. As the "owner" of the CPU, you might be able to say
when it will be available (NO, I don't like you. Power off),
but this won't help the bottom line. Same thing with an the
folks assigned the role of "operator" - they're there to enable
the business, not impede it. Users, be they your own or the
customers your system is designed to serve, will always get
a say. The issue here, as I see it, is to properly govern how
the rights assigned.

Like it or not, we're all here to ultimately make the end users
happy. Besides, isn't security supposed to support and improved
your operations? Your approach would, IMHO, do the opposite...

Alex Arndt
CISSP, GCIA
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• Previous message: Ben Vaisvil: "[Full-disclosure] Re: [ISN] How To Save The Internet"
• Maybe in reply to: Arndt.WA_at_forces.gc.ca: "[Full-disclosure] RE: [ISN] How To Save The Internet"
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