[Full-Disclosure] Re: Re: Any update on SSH brute force attempts?
From: Dave Ewart (Dave.Ewart_at_cancer.org.uk)
To: email@example.com Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2004 14:01:41 +0100
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On Monday, 18.10.2004 at 06:41 -0500, Ron DuFresne wrote:
> > > What are you doing/changing about your SSH configurations to
> > > reduce the possibility of these attacks finding any kind of hole
> > > in the OpenSSH software (that's what I run, so that's the only
> > > version I'm particularly concerned about) ? Are you doing
> > > anything at all?
> > Attacks on my system seemed to be restricted to root, so I set the
> > 'PermitRootLogin without-password' option, so that no root logins
> > using a password were possible - must be RSA key. I also switched
> > to non-standard port.
> Why not just disallow root logins directly, and force someone with a
> valid user account to su after getting a shell? It was my impression
> that was more standard, and if one has to allow remote root directly,
> at least restrict it to specific systems and users. All the places I
> have worked for forced the su after shell to root..
Well yes, that's fair enough - however, allowing direct root access does
make certain things more straightforward, automated use of 'scp' etc.
Computing Manager, Epidemiology Unit, Oxford
Cancer Research UK
PGP: CC70 1883 BD92 E665 B840 118B 6E94 2CFD 694D E370
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