RE: [Full-Disclosure] RE: COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing Expedition
From: Sandro Gauci (sandro_at_gfi.com)
Date: 06/11/04
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- Maybe in reply to: Thor Larholm: "[Full-Disclosure] RE: COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing Expedition"
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To: <full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com> Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2004 16:00:54 +0200
Just tested it out .. Yes in fact Trusted Sites and Intranet Sites
privileges can be gained through this vulnerability.
I also noticed that my MSIE 6.0.2600 (which is missing quite a few
patches) is not vulnerable to this attack. It correctly handles the url
and goes to Microsoft when the url is
"www.microsoft.com%2f%20%20%20www.egold.com". Same with Opera and
Mozilla.
My MSIE 6.0.2800 sp2 with some patches is vulnerable.
-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin@lists.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin@lists.netsys.com] On Behalf Of Thor
Larholm
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2004 3:17 AM
To: Drew Copley; full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com;
bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Cc: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] RE: COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing Expedition
You can't replicate this with most other servers because the Host header
is set to a non-existant site on most servers. However, you can use this
to gain both Trusted Sites and Intranet Sites privileges from arbitrary
websites.
Whenever IIS or Apache receives a request it will first locate the
proper site based on the IP adress being used, after which it will
lookup based on the Host header. In the case of e-gold, they have simply
not specified a Host header for the IIS website that they configured.
You can send a HTTP request to e-gold.com with "Host: foobar" and their
site still comes up, even though you should only get their site with a
header such as "Host: e-gold.com" or "Host: www.e-gold.com".
HTTP 1.1 requires the use of a Host header and it is bad practice to
accept HTTP requests without a Host header that corresponds to a locally
configured site. In most cases with IIS, this only happens if you are
using the Default Website or explicitly has choosen to not specify a
Host header for the site. You can specify multiple Host headers for a
site so there is not much excuse not to do so.
Whenever IE wants to send an HTTP request it first needs to determine
what server to connect to. Because of the URL escaping IE disregards
anything before the slash and equal sign, and sees that it has to send
an HTTP request to www.e-gold.com. It is only after IE has determined
what server to request information from that it URL decodes the URI and
ends up with http://www.microsoft.com/redir=www.e-gold.com, which it
then displays in the Address Bar and subsequently uses to determine what
security zone it should use to render the HTML. IE only decides what
security zone to use based on the Address Bar value after it has
successfully downloaded all of the HTML (untill then it is in the
Unknown Zone), at which point the URL decoding has long since happened.
If you want to exploit this to serve content from your site in the
security zone of another site, you will need to disregard the Host
header being sent by the client. A perfect candidate you can use to gain
additional privileges is WindowsUpdate.microsoft.com or
oca.microsoft.com who are both in the Trusted Sites security zone on a
default installation of Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP SP2.
You should be able to use this to compromise Windows XP SP2 through
Internet Explorer despite the My Computer zone hardening since the
Trusted Sites Zone has all of the privileges you need to plant and
execute a file.
Other than gaining access to the Trusted Sites zone, you can further
gain access to the execution privileges of the Local Intranet zone by
explicitly leaving out a TLD (Top Level Domain) in the first part of the
query. The following immediately gain Local Intranet privileges:
http://whatever%3fredir=www.e-gold.com
http://whatever%3fredir=yourevilsite.com
Regards
Thor Larholm
Senior Security Researcher
PivX Solutions
24 Corporate Plaza #180
Newport Beach, CA 92660
http://www.pivx.com
thor@pivx.com
Stock symbol: (PIVX)
Phone: +1 (949) 231-8496
PGP: 0x5A276569
6BB1 B77F CB62 0D3D 5A82 C65D E1A4 157C 5A27 6569
PivX defines a new genre in Desktop Security: Proactive Threat
Mitigation.
<http://www.pivx.com/qwikfix>
-----Original Message-----
From: Drew Copley [mailto:dcopley@eEye.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2004 4:40 PM
To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com; bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: RE: [Fwd: [Full-Disclosure] COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing
Expedition]
> Subject: [Full-Disclosure] COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing Expedition
> From: "http-equiv@excite.com" <1@malware.com>
> Date: Thu, June 10, 2004 12:35 pm
> To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> ------------
>
>
>
> Thursday, June 10, 2004
>
> The following was presented by 'bitlance winter' of Japan today:
>
> test
>
> Quite inexplicable from these quarters. Perhaps someone with server
> 'knowledge' can examine it.
>
> It carries over the address into the address bar:
>
> [screen shot: http://www.malware.com/gosh.png 72KB]
>
> while redirecting to egold. The key being %2F without that it fails.
> The big question is where is the 'redir' and why is it only applicable
> [so far] to e-gold. Other sites don't work and e- gold is running an
> old Microsoft-IIS/4.0.
IE makes this into a connection with e-gold.com like so:
GET / HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg,
application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint,
application/msword, application/x-shockwave-flash, */*
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.2; .NET CLR
1.1.4322; .NET CLR 1.0.3705)
Host: www.microsoft.com/ redir=www.e-gold.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
It never touches microsoft.com.
What is interesting, though, is IE spoofs the zone. If you change
www.microsoft.com in there to a site in your trusted zone, you will see
e-gold read as your trusted zone.
So, you should be able to bounce from any trusted zone and theoritically
from local zone -- and with adodb still being open, you should be able
to run code because of the open adodb issue.
IE doesn't talk to e-gold first. It connects to it. It sends the GET
request, it receives the first page.
But, can't replicate with other servers. It requires some more research.
>
> Working Example:
>
> http://www.malware.com/golly.html
>
>
> credit: 'bitlance winter'
>
>
> End Call
>
> --
> http://www.malware.com
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
>
>
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- Previous message: Martin Wasson: "Re: [Full-Disclosure] Possible First Crypto Virus Definitely Discovered!"
- Maybe in reply to: Thor Larholm: "[Full-Disclosure] RE: COELACANTH: Phreak Phishing Expedition"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
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