[Full-Disclosure] [OpenPKG-SA-2004.015] OpenPKG Security Advisory (ethereal)

From: OpenPKG (openpkg_at_openpkg.org)
Date: 04/16/04

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    To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com
    Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2004 17:52:24 +0200
    
    

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    ________________________________________________________________________

    OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
    http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
    openpkg-security@openpkg.org openpkg@openpkg.org
    OpenPKG-SA-2004.015 16-Apr-2004
    ________________________________________________________________________

    Package: ethereal
    Vulnerability: arbitrary code execution
    OpenPKG Specific: no

    Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
    OpenPKG CURRENT <= ethereal-0.10.2-20040329 >= ethereal-0.10.3-20040330
    OpenPKG 2.0 <= ethereal-0.10.0a-2.0.0 >= ethereal-0.10.0a-2.0.1
    OpenPKG 1.3 <= ethereal-0.9.14-1.3.0 >= ethereal-0.9.14-1.3.1

    Dependent Packages: none

    Description:
      According to a vendor security advisory [0] based on hints from Stefan
      Esser and Jonathan Heussser, several vulnerabilities of various types
      exist in the Ethereal network protocol analyzer [1]. Namely, it may be
      possible to make Ethereal crash or run arbitrary code by injecting a
      purposefully malformed packet onto the wire, by convincing someone to
      read a malformed packet trace file, or by creating a malformed color
      filter file.

      The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the
      identifiers CAN-2004-0176 [2] and CAN-2004-0365 [3] to the problems
      concerning protocol dissectors and RADIUS packets.

      The zero-length presentation protocol selector vulnerability named in
      the Ethereal vendor advisory does not affect OpenPKG though, because
      such presentation protocol selectors are not implemented in any
      Ethereal versions released by OpenPKG.

      Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm
      -q ethereal". If you have the "ethereal" package installed and its
      version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately
      upgrade it (see Solution) [4][5].

    Solution:
      Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
      [6][7], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [8][9] or a mirror
      location, verify its integrity [10], build a corresponding binary
      RPM from it [4] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
      binary RPM [5]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.0, perform the
      following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
      other releases adjust accordingly).

      $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
      ftp> bin
      ftp> cd release/2.0/UPD
      ftp> get ethereal-0.10.0a-2.0.1.src.rpm
      ftp> bye
      $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig ethereal-0.10.0a-2.0.1.src.rpm
      $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild ethereal-0.10.0a-2.0.1.src.rpm
      $ su -
      # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/ethereal-0.10.0a-2.0.1.*.rpm
    ________________________________________________________________________

    References:
      [0] http://www.ethereal.com/appnotes/enpa-sa-00013.html
      [1] http://www.ethereal.com/
      [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0176
      [3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0365
      [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
      [5] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
      [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/ethereal-0.9.14-1.3.1.src.rpm
      [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/ethereal-0.10.0a-2.0.1.src.rpm
      [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/
      [9] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/
      [10] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
    ________________________________________________________________________

    For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
    OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
    OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
    hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
    for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
    ________________________________________________________________________

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