[Full-Disclosure] [PINE-CERT-20040201] reference count overflow in shmat()

From: Joost Pol (joost_at_pine.nl)
Date: 02/05/04

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    To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
    Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2004 19:08:39 +0100
    
    

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pine Digital Security Advisory
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Advisory ID : PINE-CERT-20040201 (CAN-2004-0114)
    Authors : Joost Pol
    Vendor Informed : 2004-02-01
    Issue date : 2004-02-05
    Application : kernel / sysv shared memory
    Platforms : FreeBSD, NetBSD and OpenBSD
    Availability : http://www.pine.nl/press/pine-cert-20040201.txt
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Synopsis

            While gathering material for a security training Pine
            Digital Security encountered a reference count overflow
            condition which could lead to privilege escalation.

    Versions

            Vulnerable versions include:

            FreeBSD >= 2.2.0, NetBSD >= 1.3 and OpenBSD >= 2.6

    Impact

            Serious.

            Local users can elevate their privileges.

    Description

            The shmat(2) function maps a shared memory segment, previously
            created with the shmget(2) function, into the address space of
            the calling process.

            This function is implemented in the sysv_shm.c file:

            -- sysv_shm.c lines 317-322 --

                    vm_object_reference(shm_handle->shm_object);

                    rv = vm_map_find(&p->p_vmspace->vm_map,
                                     shm_handle->shm_object,
                                     0, &attach_va, size,
                                     (flags & MAP_FIXED) ? 0 : 1,
                                     prot, prot, 0);

                    if (rv != KERN_SUCCESS) return ENOMEM;

            -- end of code snippet --

            The shmat(2) function first increases the reference count on
            the underlying vm_object and then attempts to insert the
            vm_object into the process address space.

            The vulnerability occurs because the shmat(2) function forgets
            to decrease the reference count when the vm_map_find function
            returns failure.

            Since the caller of shmat(2) can specify the address at which
            the segment should be mapped it is possible to have vm_map_find
            return failure and thus end up with stale references.

    Exploitability

            This vulnerability can exploited (reliably) by local users:

            One would first create a shared memory segment using the shmget(2)
            function and create two seperate mappings at different locations
            in the process address space using the shmat(2) function.

            After making around 2^32-2 (invalid) calls to the shmat(2)
            function the reference count of the underlying vm_object
            will wraparound to 1.

            After deleting one of our mappings using the shmdt(2) function
            the underlying vm_object will be freed and we will still have
            one (extranous) mapping hanging around.

            One would then invoke some magic trickery and execute a suid
            binary which will reuse the freed vm_object for its stack
            segment.

            At this point one could write directly into the stack segment
            of the suid binary (using the extranous mapping) and thus
            escalate ones privileges easily.

    Disclaimer

            Pine Digital Security does not release exploits.

    Patches

            The various CVS repositories should be updated.

    References

            FreeBSD-SA-04:02.shmat.asc

            http://www.pine.nl/press/pine-cert-20040201.txt

            http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=can-2004-0114

            file://usr/src/sys/kern/sysv_shm.c
            file://usr/src/sys/vm/vm_object.c
            file://usr/src/sys/vm/vm_map.c

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