[Full-Disclosure] [OpenPKG-SA-2004.001] OpenPKG Security Advisory (inn)

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To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com
Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2004 16:39:14 +0100

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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@openpkg.org openpkg@openpkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2004.001 08-Jan-2004
________________________________________________________________________

Package: inn
Vulnerability: remote code execution
OpenPKG Specific: no

Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT <= inn-2.4.0-20031111 >= inn-2.4.0-20040108
OpenPKG 1.3 <= inn-2.4.0-1.3.0 >= inn-2.4.0-1.3.1
OpenPKG 1.2 none N.A.

Description:
  According to INN [0] announcement postings from Russ Allbery [1][2],
  Dan Riley discovered a buffer overflow in a portion of the control
  message handling code, first introduced in INN 2.4.0. It is fairly
  likely that this overflow is remotely exploitable to gain access and
  execute code under the user innd(8) runs as. INN 2.3.x and earlier
  versions are not affected.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm
  -q inn". If you have the "inn" package installed and its version
  is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade
  it (see Solution). [3][4]

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [5], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [6] or a mirror location,
  verify its integrity [7], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [3]
  and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [4].
  For the current release OpenPKG 1.3, perform the following operations
  to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust
  accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/1.3/UPD
  ftp> get inn-2.4.0-1.3.1.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig inn-2.4.0-1.3.1.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild inn-2.4.0-1.3.1.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/inn-2.4.0-1.3.1.*.rpm
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [0] http://www.isc.org/products/INN/
  [1] http://lists.litech.org/pipermail/inn-workers/2004q1/002762.html
  [2] http://lists.litech.org/pipermail/inn-workers/2004q1/002763.html
  [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/inn-2.4.0-1.3.1.src.rpm
  [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/
  [7] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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