[Full-Disclosure] SUSE Security Announcement: bind8 (SuSE-SA:2003:047)

From: Thomas Biege (thomas_at_suse.de)
Date: 11/28/03

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    To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com
    Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2003 15:58:42 +0100 (CET)
    
    

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

    ______________________________________________________________________________

                            SUSE Security Announcement

            Package: bind8
            Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2003:047
            Date: Friday, Nov 28th 2003 15:30 MEST
            Affected products: 7.3, 8.0, 8.1, 8.2
            Vulnerability Type: cache poisoning/denial-of-service
            Severity (1-10): 5
            SUSE default package: yes
            Cross References: CAN-2003-0914

        Content of this advisory:
            1) security vulnerability resolved:
               - caching negative answers
               problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information
            2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds:
               - ethereal
               - KDE
               - mc
               - apache1/2
               - gpg
               - freeradius
               - xscreensaver
               - screen
               - mod_gzip
               - gnpan
            3) standard appendix (further information)

    ______________________________________________________________________________

    1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information

        To resolve IP addresses to host and domain names and vice versa the
        DNS service needs to be consulted. The most popular DNS software is
        the BIND8 and BIND9 suite. The BIND8 code is vulnerable to a remote
        denial-of-service attack by poisoning the cache with authoritative
        negative responses that should not be accepted otherwise.
        To execute this attack a name-server needs to be under malicious
        control and the victim's bind8 has to query this name-server.
        The attacker can set a high TTL value to keep his negative record as
        long as possible in the cache of the victim. For this time the clients
        of the attacked site that rely on the bind8 service will not be able
        to reach the domain specified in the negative record.
        These records should disappear after the time-interval (TTL) elapsed.

        There is no temporary workaround for this bug.

        To make this update effective run "rcnamed restart" as root please.

        Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its
        integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement.
        Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply
        the update.
        Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages
        are being offered to install from the maintenance web.

        Intel i386 Platform:

        SuSE-8.2:
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/bind8-8.3.4-64.i586.rpm
          3d44d46f0e8397c69d53e96aba9fbd6d
        patch rpm(s):
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/bind8-8.3.4-64.i586.patch.rpm
          cce1df09a0b6fb5cbbddcc462f055c64
        source rpm(s):
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/src/bind8-8.3.4-64.src.rpm
          a980a0eca79de02f135fce1cbe84ee22

        SuSE-8.1:
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/bind8-8.2.4-336.i586.rpm
          4a46d0560eac1ca5de77c12f8abe4952
        patch rpm(s):
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/bind8-8.2.4-336.i586.patch.rpm
          c8020302f6f161e9d86a3f1615304a23
        source rpm(s):
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/src/bind8-8.2.4-336.src.rpm
          c9ee184cbd1f1722c94de9fd66f11801

        SuSE-8.0:
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n2/bind8-8.2.4-334.i386.rpm
          f739fdb03a7df6685e0aa026f98a0389
        patch rpm(s):
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n2/bind8-8.2.4-334.i386.patch.rpm
          a3de26e06b689d29b4b4b08c04fa32f4
        source rpm(s):
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-334.src.rpm
          85d8d9fee3c8a029263777a45b4af011

        SuSE-7.3:
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/n2/bind8-8.2.4-334.i386.rpm
          381c2b6f805ca30d0fefc98afaee9ba0
        source rpm(s):
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-334.src.rpm
          97a87469cfb573bdd89f8f3a2c02264f

        Sparc Platform:

        SuSE-7.3:
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/n2/bind8-8.2.4-128.sparc.rpm
          c08454b933ed2365d9d2ab1322803af6
        source rpm(s):
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-128.src.rpm
          827a7f56273c7a25ac40ffba728e9150

        PPC Power PC Platform:

        SuSE-7.3:
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/n2/bind8-8.2.4-243.ppc.rpm
          12f1f205c08449e945c8ad344a8e3b41
        source rpm(s):
        ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-243.src.rpm
          177093e76b3b8d2679089a1ab1c46d0e

    ______________________________________________________________________________

    2) Pending vulnerabilities in SUSE Distributions and Workarounds:

        - ethereal
        A new official version of ethereal, a network traffic analyzer, was
        released to fix various security-related problems.
        An update package is currently being tested and will be released
        as soon as possible.

        - KDE
        New KDE packages are currently being tested. These packages fixes
        several vulnerabilities:
          + remote root compromise (CAN-2003-0690)
          + weak cookies (CAN-2003-0692)
          + SSL man-in-the-middle attack
          + information leak through HTML-referrer (CAN-2003-0459)
          + wrong file permissions of config files
        The packages will be release as soon as testing is finished.

        - mc
        By using a special combination of links in archive-files it is possible
        to execute arbitrary commands while mc tries to open it in its VFS.
        The packages are currently tested and will be release as soon as
        possible.

        - apache1/2
        The widely used HTTP server apache has several security vulnerabilities:
          - locally exploitable buffer overflow in the regular expression code.
            The attacker must be able to modify .htaccess or httpd.conf.
            (affects: mod_alias and mod_rewrite)
          - under some circumstances mod_cgid will output its data to the
            wrong client (affects: apache2)
        The new packages are available on our FTP servers.

        - gpg
        In GnuPG version 1.0.2 a new code for ElGamal was introduced.
        This code leads to an attack on users who use ElGamal keys for
        signing. It is possible to reconstruct the private ElGamal key
        by analyzing a public ElGamal signature.
        Please note that the ElGamal algorithm is seldomly used and GnuPG
        displays several warnings when generating ElGamal signature keys.
        The default key generation process in GnuPG will create a DSA signature
        key and an ElGamal subkey for _encryption only_. These keys are not
        affected by this vulnerability.
        Anyone using ElGamal signature keys (type 20, check fourth field of
        "gpg --list-keys --with-colon" output) should revoke them.

        - freeradius
        Two vulnerabilities were found in the FreeRADIUS package.
        The remote denial-of-service attack bug was fixed and new packages
        will be released as soon as testing was successfully finished.
        The other bug is a remote buffer overflow in the module rlm_smb.
        We do not ship this module and will fix it for future releases.

        - xscreensaver
        The well known screen-saver for X is vulnerable to several local
        tmp file attacks as well as a crash when verifying a password.
        Only SuSE Linux 9.0 products are affected.
        The new packages are available on our FTP servers.

        - screen
        A buffer overflow in screen was reported. Since SuSE Linux 8.0
        we do not ship screen with the s-bit anymore. An update package
        will be released for 7.3 as soon as possible.

        - mod_gzip
        The apache module mod_gzip is vulnerable to remote code execution
        while running in debug-mode. We do not ship this module in debug-mode
        but future versions will include the fix.

        - gnpan
        A remote denial-of-service attack can be run against the GNOME
        news-reader program gnpan. This bug affects SuSE Linux 8.0, 8.1, 8.2.
        Update packages are available on our FTP servers.

    ______________________________________________________________________________

    3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information

      - Package authenticity verification:

        SUSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over
        the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important
        to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be
        sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing
        the package. There are two verification methods that can be used
        independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded
        file or rpm package:
        1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement.
        2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.

        1) execute the command
            md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm>
           after you downloaded the file from a SUSE ftp server or its mirrors.
           Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
           announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is
           cryptographically signed (usually using the key security@suse.de),
           the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package.
           We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the
           email message containing the announcement to be modified so that
           the signature does not match after transport through the mailing
           list software.
           Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
           announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
           and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
           md5 sums for the files are useless.

        2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity
           of an rpm package. Use the command
            rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm>
           to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the
           filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course,
           package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm
           package file.
           Prerequisites:
            a) gpg is installed
            b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this
               key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
               ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
               signature verification (usually root). You can import the key
               that is used by SUSE in rpm packages for SUSE Linux by saving
               this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and
               running the command (do "su -" to be root):
                gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import
               SUSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the
               key "build@suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that
               the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key
               is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg)
               and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de .

      - SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
        subscribe:

        suse-security@suse.com
            - general/linux/SUSE security discussion.
                All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list.
                To subscribe, send an email to
                    <suse-security-subscribe@suse.com>.

        suse-security-announce@suse.com
            - SUSE's announce-only mailing list.
                Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list.
                To subscribe, send an email to
                    <suse-security-announce-subscribe@suse.com>.

        For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq)
        send mail to:
            <suse-security-info@suse.com> or
            <suse-security-faq@suse.com> respectively.

        =====================================================================
        SUSE's security contact is <security@suse.com> or <security@suse.de>.
        The <security@suse.de> public key is listed below.
        =====================================================================
    ______________________________________________________________________________

        The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
        provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular,
        it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the
        authenticity of the text.
        SUSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect
        to the information contained in this security advisory.

    Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID
    pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security@suse.de>
    pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build@suse.de>

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    Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux)
    Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org

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    Bye,
         Thomas

    -- 
      Thomas Biege <thomas@suse.de>, SUSE LINUX AG, Security Support & Auditing
       "lynx -source http://www.suse.de/~thomas/contact/thomas.asc | pgp -fka"
         Key fingerprint = 51 AD B9 C7 34 FC F2 54  01 4A 1C D4 66 64 09 83
    -- 
    	... stay with me, safe and ignorant, go back to sleep...
    				- Maynard James Keenan
    _______________________________________________
    Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
    Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
    

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