Re: [Full-Disclosure] EEYE: Microsoft RPC Heap Corruption Vulnerability - Part II

Jeff.Urnaza_at_averydennison.com
Date: 09/10/03

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    To: "Full-Disclosure" <full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2003 13:26:26 -0700

    The version number in eEye's supposed *new* scanner is the same version
    number as the one they release for the previous RPC exploit, v1.0.4. In
    my initial tests of the scanner, it did not find any vulnerable hosts for
    the new RPC security hole on my network, except the ones that I already
    patched ..... strange .... looks like someone goofed on this one .....

    J

                                                                                                                                        
                          "Marc Maiffret"
                          <marc@eeye.com> To: "Full-Disclosure" <full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com>
                          Sent by: cc:
                          full-disclosure-admin@lists Subject: [Full-Disclosure] EEYE: Microsoft RPC Heap Corruption
                          .netsys.com Vulnerability - Part II
                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                        
                          09/10/2003 10:50 AM
                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                        

    Here we go again. :-o

    -Marc
    --------
    Microsoft RPC Heap Corruption Vulnerability - Part II

    Release Date:
    September 10, 2003

    Severity:
    High (Remote Code Execution)

    Systems Affected:
    Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 4.0
    Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0
    Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0, Terminal Server Edition
    Microsoft Windows 2000
    Microsoft Windows XP
    Microsoft Windows Server 2003

    Description:

    eEye Digital Security has discovered a critical remote vulnerability in
    the
    way Microsoft Windows handles certain RPC requests. The RPC (Remote
    Procedure Call) protocol provides an inter-process communication mechanism
    allowing a program running on one computer to execute code on a remote
    system.

    A vulnerability exists within the DCOM (Distributed Component Object
    Model)
    RPC interface. This interface handles DCOM object activation requests sent
    by client machines to the server.

    Note: this vulnerability differs from the vulnerability publicized in
    Microsoft Bulletin MS03-026.
    (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.asp)
    This is a new vulnerability, and a different patch that must be installed.

    By sending a malformed request packet it is possible to overwrite various
    heap structures and allow the execution of arbitrary code.

    Technical Details:

    The vulnerability can be replicated with a DCERPC "bind" packet, followed
    by
    a malformed DCERPC DCOM object activation request packet. Issuing the API
    function CoGetInstanceFromFile can generate the required request. By
    manipulating the length fields within the activation packet, portions of
    heap memory can be overwritten with data which may be user-defined.

    Sending between 4 and 5 activation packets is generally sufficient to
    trigger the overwrite.

    Upon sending the sequence of packets we were able to continually cause an
    exception within the usual suspect RtlAllocateHeap:

    PAGE:77FC8F11 mov [ecx], eax
    PAGE:77FC8F13 mov [eax+4], ecx

    We control the values of the registers eax and ecx. We can write an
    arbitrary dword to any address of our choosing.

    Execution of code can be achieved through a number of means -- the
    unhandledexceptionfilter or a PEB locking pointer for instance. For this
    specific vulnerability the best route was to overwrite a pointer within
    the
    writeable .data section of RPCSS.DLL :

    .data:761BC254 off_761BC254 dd offset loc_761A1AE7 ; DATA XREF:
    sub_761A19EF+1C_r
    .data:761BC254 ;
    sub_761A19EF+11D_w
    ...
    .data:761BC258 off_761BC258 dd offset loc_761A1B18 ; DATA XREF:
    sub_761A19EF+108_w
    .data:761BC258 ; sub_761A1DCF+13_r
    ...

    At runtime these two pointers reference RtlAllocateHeap and RtlFreeHeap
    respectively. By overwriting offset 0x761BC258 with our chosen EIP value,
    we
    control the processor directly after the heap overwrite. The added benefit
    in choosing this pointer is we have data from our received packet at
    ebp->10h which we may modify to our liking, within reason. There is one
    small obstacle that must be overcome. The first word value at that address
    is the length field of our packet, this field must translate to an opcode
    sequence that will allow us to reach our data that follows.

    Protection:
    Retina Network Security Scanner has been updated to identify this
    vulnerability.
    http://www.eeye.com/html/Products/Retina/index.html
    Also our FREE RPC scanner tool has been updated to check for this second
    vulnerability.
    http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Tools/RPCDCOM.html

    Vendor Status:
    Microsoft has released a patch for this vulnerability. The patch is
    available at:
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/?url=/technet/security/bulletin/MS

    03-039.asp

    Credit:
    Discovery: Barnaby Jack
    Additional Research: Barnaby Jack and Riley Hassell.

    Greetings:
    Thanks to Riley, and utmost respect to all of the eEye massive - masters
    of
    the black arts.
    Greets to all the new people I met in Vegas this year, especially the NZ
    crew, and many thanks to K2 (da bankrolla.) :)
    "This is my line. This is eternal." -AFI

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