[Full-Disclosure] CERT Advisory CA-2003-19 Exploitation of Vulnerabilities in Microsoft RPC Interface (fwd)

From: Muhammad Faisal Rauf Danka (mfrd_at_attitudex.com)
Date: 08/01/03

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    To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 15:55:44 -0700 (PDT)
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    Muhammad Faisal Rauf Danka

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    Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 16:59:41 -0400
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    CERT Advisory CA-2003-19 Exploitation of Vulnerabilities in Microsoft RPC
    Interface

       Original issue date: July 31, 2003
       Last revised: -
       Source: CERT/CC

       A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

    Systems Affected

         * Microsoft Windows NT 4.0
         * Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Services Edition
         * Microsoft Windows 2000
         * Microsoft Windows XP
         * Microsoft Windows Server 2003

    Overview

       The CERT/CC is receiving reports of widespread scanning and
       exploitation of two recently discovered vulnerabilities in Microsoft
       Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Interface.

    I. Description

       Reports to the CERT/CC indicate that intruders are actively scanning
       for and exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft's DCOM RPC interface
       as described in VU#568148 and CA-2003-16. Multiple exploits for this
       vulnerability have been publicly released, and there is active
       development of improved and automated exploit tools for this
       vulnerability. Known exploits target TCP port 135 and create a
       privileged backdoor command shell on successfully compromised hosts.
       Some versions of the exploit use TCP port 4444 for the backdoor, and
       other versions use a TCP port number specified by the intruder at
       run-time. We have also received reports of scanning activity for
       common backdoor ports such as 4444/TCP. In some cases, due to the RPC
       service terminating, a compromised system may reboot after the
       backdoor is accessed by an intruder.

       There appears to be a separate denial-of-service vulnerability in
       Microsoft's RPC interface that is also being targeted. Based on
       current information, we believe this vulnerability is separate and
       independent from the RPC vulnerability addressed in MS03-026. The
       CERT/CC is tracking this additional vulnerability as VU#326746 and is
       continuing to work to understand the issue and mitigation strategies.
       Exploit code for this vulnerability has been publicly released and
       also targets TCP port 135.

       In both of the attacks described above, a TCP session to port 135 is
       used to execute the attack. However, access to TCP ports 139 and 445
       may also provide attack vectors and should be considered when applying
       mitigation strategies.

    II. Impact

       A remote attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to execute
       arbitrary code with Local System privileges or to cause a denial of
       service condition.

    III. Solutions

    Apply patches

       All users are encouraged to apply the patches referred to in Microsoft
       Security Bulletin MS03-026 as soon as possible in order to mitigate
       the vulnerability described in VU#568148. These patches are also
       available via Microsoft's Windows Update service.

       Systems running Windows 2000 may still be vulnerable to at least a
       denial of service attack via VU#326746 if their DCOM RPC service is
       available via the network. Therefore, sites are encouraged to use the
       packet filtering tips below in addition to applying the patches
       supplied in MS03-026.

    Filter network traffic

       Sites are encouraged to block network access to the RPC service at
       network borders. This can minimize the potential of denial-of-service
       attacks originating from outside the perimeter. The specific services
       that should be blocked include
         * 135/TCP
         * 135/UDP
         * 139/TCP
         * 139/UDP
         * 445/TCP
         * 445/UDP

       If access cannot be blocked for all external hosts, the CERT/CC
       recommends limiting access to only those hosts that require it for
       normal operation. As a general rule, the CERT/CC recommends filtering
       all types of network traffic that are not required for normal
       operation.

       Because current exploits for VU#568148 create a backdoor, which is in
       some cases 4444/TCP, blocking inbound TCP sessions to ports on which
       no legitimate services are provided may limit intruder access to
       compromised hosts.

    Recovering from a system compromise

       If you believe a system under your administrative control has been
       compromised, please follow the steps outlined in

              Steps for Recovering from a UNIX or NT System Compromise

    Reporting

       The CERT/CC is tracking activity related to exploitation of the first
       vulnerability (VU#568148) as CERT#27479 and the second vulnerability
       (VU#326746) as CERT#24523. Relevant artifacts or activity can be sent
       to cert@cert.org with the appropriate CERT# in the subject line.

    Appendix A. Vendor Information

       This appendix contains information provided by vendors. When vendors
       report new information, this section is updated and the changes are
       noted in the revision history. If a vendor is not listed below, we
       have not received their comments.

    Microsoft

         Please see Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-026.

    Appendix B. References

         * CERT/CC Vulnerability Note VU#561284 -
           http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/561284
         * CERT/CC Vulnerability Note VU#326746 -
           http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/326746
         * Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-026 -
           http://microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.asp
         * Microsoft Knowledge Base article 823980 -
           http://support.microsoft.com?kbid=823980
       ______________________________________________________________________

       Authors: Chad Dougherty and Kevin Houle
       ______________________________________________________________________

       This document is available from:
       http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-19.html
       ______________________________________________________________________

    CERT/CC Contact Information

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       Revision History

       July 31, 2003: Initial release

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