Re: [Full-Disclosure] DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)
Valdis.Kletnieks_at_vt.edu
Date: 07/27/03
- Previous message: Paul Schmehl: "Re: [Full-Disclosure] DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)"
- In reply to: Ron DuFresne: "Re: [Full-Disclosure] DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)"
- Next in thread: manohar singh: "Re: [Full-Disclosure] DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)"
- Reply: manohar singh: "Re: [Full-Disclosure] DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
To: Ron DuFresne <dufresne@winternet.com> Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2003 00:52:14 -0400
On Sat, 26 Jul 2003 22:29:56 CDT, Ron DuFresne said:
> I'm just trying to understand how corporate networks would/should be at
> risk with this, why port 135 would not be filtered already limiting
> exposure. Is there a reason why it would not be that I'm missing? The
It's the rare corporate net indeed that doesn't have a single remotely
exploitable copy of IE or Outlook left in its entire address space.
And Slammer proved quite well that having a firewall doesn't stop squat.
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
- application/pgp-signature attachment: stored
- Previous message: Paul Schmehl: "Re: [Full-Disclosure] DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)"
- In reply to: Ron DuFresne: "Re: [Full-Disclosure] DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)"
- Next in thread: manohar singh: "Re: [Full-Disclosure] DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)"
- Reply: manohar singh: "Re: [Full-Disclosure] DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]