Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc




At 06:09 PM 1/14/2008, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

============================================================================
=
FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc Security Advisor
y
The FreeBSD Proje
ct

Topic: inet_network() buffer overflow

For programs which passes untrusted data to inet_network(), an
attacker may be able to overwrite a region of memory with user defined
data by causing specially crafted input to be passed to
inet_network().

For the "usual suspects" of applications running, (e.g. sendmail,
apache, BIND etc) would it be possible to pass crafted packets
through to this function remotely via those apps ? ie how easy is this to do
?

The usual suspects don't call inet_network().
route calls inet_network() but not routed doesn't.

Mark

% nm /usr/obj/usr/src/usr.sbin/sendmail/sendmail | grep inet
U __inet_addr
U __inet_ntoa
U __inet_ntop
U __inet_pton
%

% nm /usr/obj/usr/src/usr.sbin/named/named | grep inet
U __inet_aton
U __inet_ntop
U __inet_pton
0817f084 d cfg_type_inetcontrol
0814ee20 t inet_ntop4
0814f0f8 t inet_pton4
080fb668 t inet_totext
0817f0a0 d inetcontrol_fields
%

% nm /usr/obj/usr/src/sbin/route/route | grep inet
U __inet_aton
U __inet_lnaof
U __inet_network
U __inet_ntoa
08049a94 T inet_makenetandmask
%

---Mike

_______________________________________________
freebsd-security@xxxxxxxxxxx mailing list
http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security
To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxxxxx"
--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@xxxxxxx
_______________________________________________
freebsd-security@xxxxxxxxxxx mailing list
http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security
To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxxxxx"