RE: Jails and loopback interfaces
- From: "No@SPAM@mgEDV.net" <nospam@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 6 May 2006 13:31:08 +0200
Bigby Findrake
Sent: Friday, May 05, 2006 11:42 PM
On Thu, 4 May 2006, Oliver Fromme wrote:well, with your configurations i'm really concerned about the
192.168.10.1 = jail ip of the ws
127.0.0.1 = jail ip of the db
Don't use those IPs. In particular it's probably not a
good idea to use localhost as a jail IP. Use only loopback
IPs (other than localhost), like the example that I wrote
above.
I agree with Oliver here - there's a difference between using
the loopback
adapter and using the localhost (127.0.0.1) IP. I would strongly
recommend against using localhost as a jail IP unless you
have a specific
reason *to* do that - in other words, just assign an alias to
the loopback
adapter and use that alias for the jail.
One reason that comes to mind immediately in response to the unasked
question, "why not use the loopback address for a jail?" is
that using the
loopback address for a jail makes it hard to seperate (for
use by packet
filters, for instance) host machine traffic from jail machine traffic.
There are probably other good reasons for *not* using the
loopback address
for a jail as well, but I can't think of any of them.
And of course you should use appropriate packetfilter rulesto enforce
what kind of access between the jails is allowed. Onlyallow what you
need.
I agree again. If you're using the jail for security, lock
it down, only
allow traffic that should be going to (and from!) the jail,
and disallow
everything else. Servers tend to accept connections, and not
initiate
them. If this is the case for your server processes, use stateful
firewall rules to enforce the direction of connections - for
instance, you
might want to allow connections to port 80 on your jail, but
you probably
wouldn't want people launching attacks *from* port 80 on your
jail once
they compromise your webserver. Assume that your jail will
get hacked,
and do all you can to prevent that jail from being a useful
staging point
for your attackers next wave of attacks.
overlapping configurations of ip-addresses on the loopback-
adapter.
lo0 is originally configured with 127/8 and i'm not sure, if
there's not a chance to confuse something if you add ip's in
the same range (127.0.1.1/32). as far as i read on other posts
about overlapping ip's it's not recommended (at least by some
guys).
what about configuring something like:
ifconfig lo1 plumb
ifconfig lo1 10.10.10.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 up
... and so on for futher jails?
also, the handling of 127/8 would be much clearer in the fw,
as far as my understandings are.
to your security concerns about jailed processes, that are overtaken
by hackers: my primary goal is not protecting the box (yes, we
backup them ,-) ), it's more protecting the data on it. and if
i have very good and tight jails and an attacker is able to eg.
download all customer data by code injection on the http-frontend,
i guess a less tight jail is one of my last problems!
and the jail can be as tight as possible, if there's just one
php-script that fails, all the jailing/fw-rules don't help, because
the communication between ws<--->db has to work anyway.
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