Re: mount -u -r drops nosuid ?
From: Andriy Gapon (avg_at_icyb.net.ua)
Date: 11/21/05
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- In reply to: Lowell Gilbert: "Re: mount -u -r drops nosuid ?"
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Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2005 20:40:24 +0200 To: Lowell Gilbert <freebsd-security-local@be-well.ilk.org>
on 21/11/2005 15:43 Lowell Gilbert said the following:
> The behaviour is explicitly documented.
>
> I think it is safer (less room to shoot yourself in the foot) to have
> the flags be exactly the ones you specified in the remount (no more,
> no less) than to have to know exactly what the state was beforehand.
> But clearly it's possible to surprise the operator either way.
Actually, somebody (Vasiliy <security@gugol.ru>) off the list tought me
about -o current option to mount. Really useful, I wonder how I managed
to not notice it so far. Thanks Vasily!
-- Andriy Gapon _______________________________________________ freebsd-security@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-unsubscribe@freebsd.org"
- Previous message: Sergey Matveychuk: "chmlib: Major security fix for stack overflow vulnerability"
- In reply to: Lowell Gilbert: "Re: mount -u -r drops nosuid ?"
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