Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-05:09.htt [REVISED]
From: Colin Percival (cperciva_at_freebsd.org)
Date: 05/18/05
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Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 16:18:32 -0700 To: David Schultz <das@freebsd.org>
David Schultz wrote:
> Some colleagues and I have a paper in submission that addresses
> the issue of key-dependent control flow, much as you describe.
Care to send me a pre-print?
> If you're willing to wait a day or two, you don't even need to
> have a local account:
>
> http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/ssl-timing.html
1. The Boneh-Brumley attack is specific to a particular method of
performing large integer arithmetic (and thus only applies to RSA,
DH, and DSS). My attack applies to essentially all code -- both
crypto and non-crypto -- although I picked RSA/OpenSSL as a good
demonstration platform.
2. The Boneh-Brumley attack was fixed two years ago.
> I'm just reading Colin's paper now---so as you say, it sounds like
> the punchline is that having a local account buys you a few orders
> of magnitude in attack time. Kewl.
No. On hyperthreaded systems which don't run FreeBSD or SCO, having
a local account buys you an attack which would otherwise be impossible.
(Unless you're running a really old version of OpenSSL.)
Colin Percival
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