Re: Strange command histories in hacked shell history

From: Slawek (sgp_at_telsatgp.com.pl)
Date: 12/18/04

  • Next message: Craig Edwards: "Re: Strange command histories in hacked shell history"
    To: <bv@wjv.com>, <freebsd-security@freebsd.org>
    Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2004 12:39:06 +0100
    
    

    Hello!
    In message to <freebsd-security@freebsd.org> sent Fri, 17 Dec 2004
    21:25:56 -0500 you wrote:

     BV> I understand that after using Unix for about 2 decades.
     BV> However in FreeBSD a user is supposed to be in the wheel group [if
     BV> it exists] to be able to su to root.

     BV> But if a person who is not in wheel su's to a user who is in wheel,
     BV> then they can su to root - as the system sees them as the other
     BV> user. This means that the 'wheel' security really is nothing more
     BV> than a 2 password method to get to root.

     BV> If the EUID of the orignal invoker is checked, even if they su'ed
     BV> to a person in wheel, then they should not be able to su to root.

    You can block access to su for untrusted users.

    Although keep in mind that attackers would still be able to log in to
    cracked wheel UID using ssh and then su to root - it still doesn't need
    anything more that the same two passwords.

    You can disable password logins for wheel UIDs at all and log in using
    certificates.

    -- 
    Slawomir Piotrowski
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  • Next message: Craig Edwards: "Re: Strange command histories in hacked shell history"