Kerberos 5 Security Alert?

From: Daniel Rudy (dr2867_at_pacbell.net)
Date: 09/14/04

  • Next message: Jeff Aitken: "Re: Kerberos 5 Security Alert?"
    Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 15:07:36 -0700
    To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org
    
    

    Why wasn't there a FreeBSD security alert for Kerberos 5? Does FreeBSD
    use the MIT implementation? I got an email from CERT about this. See
    the attached message below.

    -- 
    Daniel Rudy
    >From - Sat Sep 04 03:22:15 2004
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    Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2004 16:13:11 -0400
    Message-Id: <TA04-247A.28558@us-cert.gov>
    From: CERT Advisory <cert-advisory@cert.org>
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    Organization: CERT(R) Coordination Center - +1 412-268-7090
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    Subject: US-CERT Technical Cyber Security Alert TA04-247A --
    Vulnerabilities in MIT Kerberos 5
    Precedence: list
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    Hash: SHA1
                            National Cyber Alert System
                      Technical Cyber Security Alert TA04-247A
    Vulnerabilities in MIT Kerberos 5
       Original release date: September 3, 2004
       Last revised: --
       Source: US-CERT
    Systems Affected
         * MIT Kerberos 5 versions prior to krb5-1.3.5
         * Applications that use versions of MIT Kerberos 5 libraries prior
           to krb5-1.3.5
         * Applications that contain code derived from MIT Kerberos 5
       Updated vendor information is available in the systems affected
       section of the individual vulnerability notes.
    Overview
       The MIT Kerberos 5 implementation contains several vulnerabilities,
       the most severe of which could allow an unauthenticated, remote
       attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Kerberos Distribution Center
       (KDC). This could result in the compromise of an entire Kerberos
       realm.
    I. Description
       There are several vulnerabilities in the MIT implementation of the
       Kerberos 5 protocol. With one exception (VU#550464), all of the
       vulnerabilities involve insecure deallocation of heap memory
       (double-free vulnerabilities) during error handling and Abstract
       Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) decoding. For further details, please see
       the following vulnerability notes:
       VU#795632 - MIT Kerberos 5 ASN.1 decoding functions insecurely
       deallocate memory (double-free)
        The MIT Kerberos 5 library does not securely deallocate heap memory
        when decoding ASN.1 structures, resulting in double-free
        vulnerabilities. An unauthenticated, remote attacker could execute
        arbitrary code on a KDC server, which could compromise an entire
        Kerberos realm. An attacker may also be able to execute arbitrary code
        on Kerberos clients, or cause a denial of service on KDCs or clients.
        (Other resources: MITKRB5-SA-2004-002, CAN-2004-0642)
       VU#866472 - MIT Kerberos 5 ASN.1 decoding function krb5_rd_cred()
       insecurely deallocates memory (double-free)
        The krb5_rd_cred() function in the MIT Kerberos 5 library does not
        securely deallocate heap memory when decoding ASN.1 structures,
        resulting in a double-free vulnerability. A remote, authenticated
        attacker could execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service on
        any system running an application that calls krb5_rd_cred(). This
        includes Kerberos application servers and other applications that
        process Kerberos authentication via the MIT Kerberos 5 library,
        Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface (GSSAPI),
        and other libraries.
        (Other resources: MITKRB5-SA-2004-002, CAN-2004-0643)
       VU#350792 - MIT Kerberos krb524d insecurely deallocates memory
       (double-free)
        The MIT Kerberos krb524d daemon does not securely deallocate heap
        memory when handling an error condition, resulting in a double-free
        vulnerability. An unauthenticated, remote attacker could execute
        arbitrary code on a system running krb524d, which in many cases is
        also a KDC. The compromise of a KDC system can lead to the compromise
        of an entire Kerberos realm. An attacker may also be able to cause a
        denial of service on a system running krb524d.
        (Other resources: MITKRB5-SA-2004-002, CAN-2004-0772)
       VU#550464 - MIT Kerberos 5 ASN.1 decoding function asn1buf_skiptail()
       does not properly terminate loop
        The asn1buf_skiptail() function in the MIT Kerberos 5 library does not
        properly terminate a loop, allowing an unauthenticated, remote
        attacker to cause a denial of service in a KDC, application server, or
        Kerberos client.
        (Other resources: MITKRB5-SA-2004-003, CAN-2004-0644)
    II. Impact
       The impacts of these vulnerabilities vary, but an attacker may be able
       to execute arbitrary code on KDCs, systems running krb524d (typically
       also KDCs), application servers, applications that use Kerberos
       libraries directly or via GSSAPI, and Kerberos clients. An attacker
       could also cause a denial of service on any of these systems.
       The most severe vulnerabilities could allow an unauthenticated, remote
       attacker to execute arbitrary code on a KDC system. This could result
       in the compromise of both the KDC and an entire Kerberos realm.
    III. Solution
    Apply a patch or upgrade
       Check with your vendor(s) for patches or updates. For information
       about a specific vendor, please see the systems affected sections in
       the individual vulnerability notes or contact your vendor directly.
       Alternatively, apply the appropriate source code patch(es) referenced
       in MITKRB5-SA-2004-002 and MITKRB5-SA-2004-003 and recompile.
       These vulnerabilities will be addressed in krb5-1.3.5.
    Appendix A. References
         * Vulnerability Note VU#795632 -
           <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/795632>
         * Vulnerability Note VU#866472 -
           <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/866472>
         * Vulnerability Note VU#350792 -
           <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/350792>
         * Vulnerability Note VU#550464 -
           <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/550464>
         * MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2004-002 -
           <http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2004-002-dblfre
           e.txt>
         * MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2004-003 -
           <http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2004-003-as
           n1.txt>
         * Kerberos: The Network Authentication Protocol -
           <http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/>
      _______________________________________________________________________
       Thanks to Tom Yu and the MIT Kerberos Development team for addressing
       these vulnerabilities and coordinating with vendors. MIT credits the
       following people: Will Fiveash, Joseph Galbraith, John Hawkinson, Marc
       Horowitz, and Nico Williams.
      _______________________________________________________________________
       Feedback can be directed to the author: Art Manion
      _______________________________________________________________________
       This document is available from:
         <http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA04-245A.html>
      _______________________________________________________________________
       Copyright 2004 Carnegie Mellon University. Terms of use
       Terms of use: <http://www.us-cert.gov/legal.html>
      _______________________________________________________________________
       Revision History
        September 3, 2004: Initial release
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  • Next message: Jeff Aitken: "Re: Kerberos 5 Security Alert?"

    Relevant Pages

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