Re: TCP RST attack

From: Matthew Dillon (
Date: 04/20/04

  • Next message: Mark Johnston: "Re: TCP RST attack"
    Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 13:45:20 -0700 (PDT)
    To: Charles Swiger <>

        Well, the advisory certainly exaggerates some, but I think there is
        a real issue with BGP and I have to respectfully disagree with DES.
        Route flapping cannot be solved by reducing hysteresis, at least not
        unless you want your backbone provider to cut you off! Flapping is
        a major problem... less of one now then when I was doing BEST a decade
        ago, but still very serious. When a BGP session flaps it has to
        resynchronize, and resynchronization can take a significant period
        of time, bandwidth, and router resources to accomplish. You can't
        just reconnect and pick up where you left off (if you could it would
        be a non-problem).

        On the other hand, BGP can be trivially protected. You don't need
        ingress or egress filtering at all (by which I mean IP block filtering),
        you simply disable the routing of any packet to or from port 179.
        99.9% of all BGP links are direct connections (meaning that they
        terminate at a router rather then pass through one). No packet to
        or from port 179 has any business being routed from one network to
        another in virtually all BGP link setups so the fix is utterly trivial.


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