Re: suid bit files + securing FreeBSD (new program: LockDown)

From: Socketd (db_at_traceroute.dk)
Date: 07/27/03

  • Next message: Socketd: "Re: suid bit files + securing FreeBSD (new program: LockDown)"
    Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2003 13:28:47 +0200
    To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org
    
    
    

    On Sun, 27 Jul 2003 09:57:10 +1000
    Peter Jeremy <PeterJeremy@optushome.com.au> wrote:

    > > But what files REALLY MUST have it ?
    >
    > There's no simple answer to this. It's a matter of going through each
    > file with setuid (or setgid) set, understanding why that file has the
    > set[gu]id bit and whether you need that functionality.

    Robert Watson is going through all the setuid files, to see which really
    need to be setuid. In -CURRENT he has removed the setuid bit from quota.

    Anyway I have been thinking about writing a program to make the default
    installation (with "extreme" security) even more secure. I have attached
    the configuration file, it should explain what the program can do. (not
    one line of code have been written yet).

    Btw setting noexec and nosuid on a mount point is a little redundante
    right? I mean since the user can't execute files, there is no point in
    also setting nosuid?

    Best regards
    Socketd

    ps: Please remember that the LockDown configuration file is only version
    0.1, so nothing is final.

    
    
    

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