[Fwd: CERT Advisory CA-2003-13 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Snort Preprocessors]

From: Christopher Nehren (apeiron@comcast.net)
Date: 04/17/03

  • Next message: Sergey A. Osokin: "Re: [Fwd: CERT Advisory CA-2003-13 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Snort Preprocessors]"
    Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2003 16:51:15 -0400
    From: Christopher Nehren <apeiron@comcast.net>
    To: security@freebsd.org
    
    
    

    I figured that someone reading this list might want to take a look at
    the proceeding, considering that the version of Snort in FreeBSD ports
    -is- affected.

    -----Forwarded Message-----

    > From: CERT Advisory <cert-advisory@cert.org>
    > To: cert-advisory@cert.org
    > Subject: CERT Advisory CA-2003-13 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Snort Preprocessors
    > Date: 17 Apr 2003 11:30:47 -0400
    >
    >
    >
    > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    >
    > CERT Advisory CA-2003-13 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Snort Preprocessors
    >
    > Original release date: April 17, 2003
    > Last revised: --
    > Source: CERT/CC
    >
    > A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
    >
    > Systems Affected
    >
    > * Snort IDS, versions 1.8 through 2.0 RC1
    >
    > Overview
    >
    > There are two vulnerabilities in the Snort Intrusion Detection System,
    > each in a separate preprocessor module. Both vulnerabilities allow
    > remote attackers to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
    > user running Snort, typically root.
    >
    > I. Description
    >
    > The Snort intrusion detection system ships with a variety of
    > preprocessor modules that allow the user to selectively include
    > additional functionality. Researchers from two independent
    > organizations have discovered vulnerabilities in two of these modules,
    > the RPC preprocessor and the "stream4" TCP fragment reassembly
    > preprocessor.
    >
    > For additional information regarding Snort, please see
    >
    > http://www.snort.org/.
    >
    > VU#139129 - Heap overflow in Snort "stream4" preprocessor (CAN-2003-0029)
    >
    > Researchers at CORE Security Technologies have discovered a remotely
    > exploitable heap overflow in the Snort "stream4" preprocessor module.
    > This module allows Snort to reassemble TCP packet fragments for
    > further analysis.
    >
    > To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must disrupt the state
    > tracking mechanism of the preprocessor module by sending a series of
    > packets with crafted sequence numbers. This causes the module to
    > bypass a check for buffer overflow attempts and allows the attacker to
    > insert arbitrary code into the heap.
    >
    > For additional information, please read the Core Security Technologies
    > Advisory located at
    >
    > http://www.coresecurity.com/common/showdoc.php?idx=313&idxseccion=10
    >
    > This vulnerability affects Snort versions 1.8.x, 1.9.x, and 2.0 prior
    > to RC1. Snort has published an advisory regarding this vulnerability;
    > it is available at
    >
    > http://www.snort.org/advisories/snort-2003-04-16-1.txt.
    >
    > VU#916785 - Buffer overflow in Snort RPC preprocessor (CAN-2003-0033)
    >
    > Researchers at Internet Security Systems (ISS) have discovered a
    > remotely exploitable buffer overflow in the Snort RPC preprocessor
    > module. Martin Roesch, primary developer for Snort, described the
    > vulnerability as follows:
    >
    > When the RPC decoder normalizes fragmented RPC records, it
    > incorrectly checks the lengths of what is being normalized against
    > the current packet size, leading to an overflow condition. The RPC
    > preprocessor is enabled by default.
    >
    > For additional information, please read the ISS X-Force advisory
    > located at
    >
    > http://www.iss.net/issEn/delivery/xforce/alertdetail.jsp?oid=21951
    >
    > This vulnerability affects Snort versions 1.8.x through 1.9.1 and
    > version 2.0 Beta.
    >
    > II. Impact
    >
    > Both VU#139129 and VU#916785 allow remote attackers to execute
    > arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running Snort,
    > typically root. In addition, it is not necessary for the attacker to
    > know the IP address of the Snort device they wish to attack; merely
    > sending malicious traffic where it can be observed by an affected
    > Snort sensor is sufficient to exploit these vulnerabilities.
    >
    > III. Solution
    >
    > Upgrade to Snort 2.0
    >
    > Both VU#139129 and VU#916785 are addressed in Snort version 2.0, which
    > is available at
    >
    > http://www.snort.org/dl/snort-2.0.0.tar.gz
    >
    > Binary-only versions of Snort are available from
    >
    > http://www.snort.org/dl/binaries
    >
    > For information from other vendors that ship affected versions of
    > Snort, please see Appendix A of this document.
    >
    > Disable affected preprocessor modules
    >
    > Sites that are unable to immediately upgrade affected Snort sensors
    > may prevent exploitation of this vulnerability by commenting out the
    > affected preprocessor modules in the "snort.conf" configuration file.
    >
    > To prevent exploitation of VU#139129, comment out the following line:
    >
    > preprocessor stream4_reassemble
    >
    > To prevent exploitation of VU#916785, comment out the following line:
    >
    > preprocessor rpc_decode: 111 32771
    >
    > After commenting out the affected modules, send a SIGHUP signal to the
    > affected Snort process to update the configuration. Note that
    > disabling these modules may have adverse affects on a sensor's ability
    > to correctly process RPC record fragments and TCP packet fragments. In
    > particular, disabling the "stream4" preprocessor module will prevent
    > the Snort sensor from detecting a variety of IDS evasion attacks.
    >
    > Block outbound packets from Snort IDS systems
    >
    > You may be able limit an attacker's capabilities if the system is
    > compromised by blocking all outbound traffic from the Snort sensor.
    > While this workaround will not prevent exploitation of the
    > vulnerability, it may make it more difficult for the attacker to
    > create a useful exploit.
    >
    > Appendix A. - Vendor Information
    >
    > This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
    > advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
    > update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
    > particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
    > comments.
    >
    > Apple Computer, Inc.
    >
    > Snort is not shipped with Mac OS X or Mac OS X Server.
    >
    > Ingrian Networks
    >
    > Ingrian Networks products are not susceptible to VU#139129 and
    > VU#916785 since they do not use Snort.
    >
    > Ingrian customers who are using the IDS Extender Service Engine to
    > mirror cleartext data to a Snort-based IDS should upgrade their IDS
    > software.
    >
    > NetBSD
    >
    > NetBSD does not include snort in the base system.
    >
    > Snort is available from the 3rd party software system, pkgsrc. Users
    > who have installed net/snort, net/snort-mysql or net/snort-pgsql
    > should update to a fixed version. pkgsrc/security/audit-packages can
    > be used to keep up to date with these types of issues.
    >
    > Red Hat Inc.
    >
    > Not vulnerable. Red Hat does not ship Snort in any of our supported
    > products.
    >
    > SGI
    >
    > SGI does not ship snort as part of IRIX.
    >
    > Snort
    >
    > Snort 2.0 has undergone an external third party professional security
    > audit funded by Sourcefire.
    > _________________________________________________________________
    >
    > The CERT/CC acknowledges Bruce Leidl, Juan Pablo Martinez Kuhn, and
    > Alejandro David Weil of Core Security Technologies for their discovery
    > of VU#139129. We also acknowledge Mark Dowd and Neel Mehta of ISS
    > X-Force for their discovery of VU#916785.
    > _________________________________________________________________
    >
    > Authors: Jeffrey P. Lanza and Cory F. Cohen.
    > ______________________________________________________________________
    >
    > This document is available from:
    > http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-13.html
    > ______________________________________________________________________
    >
    > CERT/CC Contact Information
    >
    > Email: cert@cert.org
    > Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
    > Fax: +1 412-268-6989
    > Postal address:
    > CERT Coordination Center
    > Software Engineering Institute
    > Carnegie Mellon University
    > Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
    > U.S.A.
    >
    > CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
    > EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
    > during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
    >
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    >
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    >
    > If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
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    >
    > Getting security information
    >
    > CERT publications and other security information are available from
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    > http://www.cert.org/
    >
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    >
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    >
    > * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
    > Patent and Trademark Office.
    > ______________________________________________________________________
    >
    > NO WARRANTY
    > Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
    > Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
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    > Copyright 2003 Carnegie Mellon University.
    >
    > Revision History
    > April 17, 2003: Initial release
    >
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  • Next message: Sergey A. Osokin: "Re: [Fwd: CERT Advisory CA-2003-13 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Snort Preprocessors]"

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