Re: syslogd security bug?

From: Alfred Perlstein (bright@mu.org)
Date: 04/29/02 

Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 14:49:29 -0700
From: Alfred Perlstein <bright@mu.org>
To: Piotr Wiejaczka <wiejak@alpha.net.pl>

* Piotr Wiejaczka <wiejak@alpha.net.pl> [020429 14:44] wrote:
> Hi all.
>
> %uname -a
> FreeBSD localhost 4.5-STABLE FreeBSD 4.5-STABLE #1: Tue Mar 12 08:20:11 CET
> 2002 root@:/usr/src/sys/compile/OKO2 i386
>
> %cat syslog.c
> #include <syslog.h>
> #include <stdarg.h>
>
> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
> syslog(LOG_EMERG, argv[1]);
> }
>
> %./syslog "blah %x %x %x %x"
>
> Message from syslogd@localhost at Mon Apr 29 23:27:35 2002 ...
> localhost syslog: blah 2807aebe 2 bfbffc5c bfbffd26
>
>
> Looks like we have a format string bug inside syslogd :)

You're kidding right?

Please read the syslog(3) manpage. 

-- 
-Alfred Perlstein [alfred@freebsd.org]
'Instead of asking why a piece of software is using "1970s technology,"
 start asking why software is ignoring 30 years of accumulated wisdom.'
Tax deductible donations for FreeBSD: http://www.freebsdfoundation.org/
To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org
with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message

Relevant Pages

  • syslogd security bug?
    ... int main(int argc, char *argv) ... Looks like we have a format string bug inside syslogd:) ... with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message ...
    (FreeBSD-Security)
  • Re: syslogd security bug?
    ... > %cat syslog.c ... > Looks like we have a format string bug inside syslogd:) ... with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message ...
    (FreeBSD-Security)
  • Re: strange messages
    ... it IS an inapplicable remote rpc.statd exploit which never applied ... these are the signatures of a format string bug, ... nothing more than an annoyance unless you have Linux systems you ... with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message ...
    (FreeBSD-Security)