new openSSH hole?
From: Markus Hallström (tubbs@freebsd.se)
Date: 04/20/02
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Date: Sat, 20 Apr 2002 00:43:33 +0200 From: Markus Hallström <tubbs@freebsd.se> To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org
This just showed up on vuln-dev
On Fri, 2002-04-19 at 15:48, Marcell Fodor wrote:
>
>
> The bug affects servers offering Kerberos TGT
> and/or AFS Token passing. The vulnerability can lead
> to a root compromise.
>
> more : mantra.freeweb.hu
>
> Marcell Fodor
>
on http://mantra.freeweb.hu I get the following information
18.04.2002
security bug report:
OpenSSH 2.2.0 - 3.1.0 server contains a locally exploitable buffer overflow.
The bug affects servers offering Kerberos TGT and/or AFS Token passing.
The vulnerability can lead to a root compromise.
bug details:
radix.c
GETSTRING macro in radix_to_creds function may cause buffer overflow.
affected buffers:
creds->service
creds->instance
creds->realm
creds->pinst
user can exploit the vulnerability by sending malformed request for:
1. pass Kerberos IV TGT
2. pass AFS Token
For security considerations the CREDENTIALS structure is erased at the end of
the auth_krb4_tgt function (auth_krb4.c). This makes code injection impossible at
the first look, since the user supplied code is cleared.
Well, it's all there! Check the temp[] buffer in radix_to_creds() function. This is
the place, where the server decoded the ticket.
It should be considered in further versions to clear the temp buffer prior
returning from the radix_to_creds function.
Is this known? should I worry?
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