Re: Theory Question

From: Lee Smallbone (lee@kechara.net)
Date: 04/08/01 

Date: Sun, 08 Apr 2001 10:48:38 +0100
To: "Jacques A. Vidrine" <n@nectar.com>, John Howie <JHowie@msn.com>
From: Lee Smallbone <lee@kechara.net>

Thanks to everyone who has replied thus far. It has been very enlightening!

07/04/2001 14:00:40, "Jacques A. Vidrine" <n@nectar.com> wrote:

<snip>

>If the `key' to your security is obscurity of your internal network
>configuration, expect to be comprimised. This information is not hard
>to obtain by a determined attacker, and technology is probably not
>even an issue.

 Of course, there is an element of StO that is beneficial. There are (on last estimation),
 1-4,000 blackhats and 200,000 script kiddies. The chances are that if you do not
 posses anything vaguely interesting (such as credit cards transactions, medical records
 or whatever) blackhat attention will be somewhat lower (but non-zero). It is *far* more likely
 script kiddies will be the thorn in your foot, thus StO will probably ward of 40-60% of
 kiddies, as they cannot easily obtain what they need. "Just enter a different subnet and
 try again..." Proactive security will nab a further 30%, leaving just 10% to be of concern.

 Just my two cents anyway. 

--
Lee Smallbone
Kechara Internet
lee@kechara.net
www.kechara.net 
Tel: (01243) 869 969
Fax: (01243) 866 685
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